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matemática, e a Susana Peralta sempre disponivel para conversar. Agradeço ao
Pedro Vicente o empurrão que me deu para ir para os Estados Unidos, e à Isabel
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Introduction
Interest rates and inflation have been persistently low in relevant world economies.
When the zero lower bound for the nominal interest rate prevents the real interest
rate to reach an eventually negative full employment level - the Natural Rate of
Interest - an economy may enter into a stable recession, according to recent work
on Secular Stagnation [34] and Liquidity traps [31]. Moreover, when the zero lower
bound for nominal interest rates binds, short term monetary policy may lose effec-
tiveness.
Understanding the factors that may drag down the Natural Rate of Interest in a
permanent way is a fundamental step in order to design the most adequate poli-
cies to overcome or to avoid the undesirable consequences of a prolonged economic
slump. Some of those factors have been explored in recent literature, where we
can namely highlight diminishing borrowing limits during longstanding deleverag-
ing shocks in Eggertsson and Mehrotra [21] recent work on Secular Stagnation, or
demographic changes inspected for example by Carvalho et al. [12]. Inspecting the
mechanisms dragging down the natural rate of interest in a longstanding way may
require alternative modeling options to the standard single agent RBC and New
Keynesian frameworks, where negative real interest rate levels are generally tempo-
rary by construction. Moreover, the policy prescriptions to counteract a temporary
recession may not necessarily be applicable when dealing with a lasting economic
slump, where the impact of a policy must be permanent. For example, when a
vii
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higher level of inflation is not a desirable policy outcome to allow a first best solu-
tion consistent with a negative natural rate of interest, Correia et al. [16] propose an
emulation of the role of higher consumer price inflation through a temporary stable
increase of consumption taxes in a single agent NK model. The transitory nature of
that prescription might not be useful if the natural rate of interest is permanently
low; in contrast with alternative policies that may permanently level-up the natural
rate of interest to a level where monetary policy becomes effective again.
Our research aims at complementing recent work on counteracting persistent reces-
sions, as well as analytically inspecting mechanisms with persistent impact on the
natural rate of interest. In particular, our contribution in Chapter 1 is to inspect
the role of distortionary taxes in avoiding a permanent slump, complementing recent
work on Secular Stagnation , and on the role of distortionary taxation in temporary
recessions. Our contribution in Chapters 2 and 3 is to inspect analytically the im-
pact of changing age milestones and inequality on the natural rate of interest, by
deriving explicit algebraic relations between real interest rate changes and changes
on those factors.
In the first Chapter we formalize the role of distortionary taxation in avoiding a
stable recession characterized by the Secular Stagnation framework proposed by
Eggertsson and Mehrotra [21], based on a three generations OLG model with bor-
rowing constraints. We compare our results with the ones obtained by Correia
et al. [16] that propose a solution based on the same set of distortionary taxes in
a standard single agent New Keynesian model without borrowing constraints, to
counteract a liquidity trap that is by construction temporary. We find reversed re-
sults. Our mechanism is based on a wealth re-distributive policy using distortionary
taxes to increase the natural rate of interest so that it becomes achievable given the
monetary policy targets, by increasing labor taxes on the middle age employed and
redistributing the tax proceeds to the population in general by reducing consump-
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tion tax. Instead, Correia et al. [16] emulate inflation in consumer prices using an
increasing path of consumption taxes, so that the intertemporal condition allows
an achievable negative natural rate of interest, and the liquidity trap is neutralized.
We use the same fiscal toolbox with different approaches. We increase the natural
rate of interest to a level consistent with monetary policy effectiveness, instead of
temporarily allowing a first best solution compatible with a negative natural rate of
interest.
As an alternative to the standard fiscal policy prescriptions to counteract an eco-
nomic downturn, based on Keynesian increases of public expenditures, more public
debt and tax cuts to stimulate demand1, and complementing the papers referenced
above, the main purpose of our analysis is to show how fiscal policy based on dis-
tortionary taxation can be effective in avoiding persistent recessions, even when
increasing public expenditures and debt are not policy options available.
In the second chapter we formalize the relation between real interest rates and rele-
vant age milestones of an agent’s life, using an overlapping multi-generations model
where one generation correspond to one year. Although the impact of age structure
in relevant World economies has been a recurrent topic covered in recent litera-
ture, in particular to explain the persistent decline of interest rates and economic
stagnation, there has not yet been an attempt, to the best of our knowledge, to
formally derive the analytic relations of real interest rates to each age milestone.
The purpose of this chapter is to fill out this gap, by deriving tractable algebraic
real interest rate elasticity expressions with respect to each age parameter, in or-
der to formalize the mechanisms by which real interest rate changes occur. This
allows, for example, to algebraically derive precisely by how much the natural rate
of interest may be permanently dragged down eventually to negative levels, by any
combination of increasing life expectancy, postponing first child birth, lowering the
1Besides other non-fiscal approaches, namely the one proposed by Eggertsson and Woodford
[23] where the central bank commits to keep interest rates at a lower level even after a recession
resulting from a liquidity trap is over.
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retirement age, increasing adulthood age, or reducing the age of first job. Moreover,
we can use our framework to quantify explicitly the impact on the reduction of
real interest rate level in recent years, of the evolution of population age structure.
The main underlying mechanism relating age milestones and real interest rates in
our model relies on the relative place and duration of labor income with respect
to life expectancy when agents smooth consumption. For example, a longer retire-
ment period, resulting from a reduction of the retirement age or an increase of life
expectancy, makes households save more, thus expanding the supply of loans that
drags down the real interest rate that ensures equilibrium in the loan market. We
also inspect how exogenous parameters to our model, namely the elasticity of inter-
temporal substitution, productivity growth, income growth path of households, and
population growth, may amplify or mitigate the impact of age milestones changes
on the natural rate of interest. In addition we show how inter-generation transfers
are affected by age milestone changes. For example, why and how increasing life
expectancy may reduce endogenous bequest levels, decrease the propensity to help
children, or increase the willingness to help parents. Laterally to our main contribu-
tion in this chapter, the analytic formulation of interest rate changes with respect to
age milestones, we also developed a tractable algebraic toolbox to solve overlapping
multi-generations optimization problems.
Finally in Chapter 3, we formalize the relation between increasing income inequality
and low real interest rates using an overlapping generations model with borrowing
constraints and a bequest motive. Our main contribution in this chapter is to
present in a single simple framework an explicit formalism linking low real interest
rates with increasing income inequality, by gathering and building on some relevant
topics in recent literature, namely increasing income inequality[33], bequests[4][7],
the question of whether higher-lifetime income levels lead to higher marginal propen-
sity to save[19] and lower marginal propensity to borrow[1][32], and secular stagna-
tion[21][34]. The underlying mechanism in our model relating real interest rates
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and inequality is based on empirical evidence in recent literature that households’
marginal borrowing and saving rates are respectively negative and positive functions
of income, so that the net effect on aggregate borrowing and savings of a permanent
increase of income inequality is respectively a net contraction and a net expansion,
that may lead to a persistent reduction of the natural rate of interest. In particular,
the borrowing mechanism in our model is based on the concavity of the marginal
propensity to borrow, and on binding borrowing constraints, both consistent with
empirical observations in recent literature[1][32]. In addition, the saving mechanism
is illustrated with an endogenous propensity of households to leave a bequest when
they expect the next generation to be poorer. So that wealthier households are more
generous, making their marginal savings rate higher than the poor that in general
leave much lower or no bequests at all, as also observed by Hendricks [28].
Chapter 1
Distortionary Taxation in Stable
Recessions
Abstract
Increasing public spending, generating budget deficits, or raising the level of public debt,
may not be options available for an economy trying to avoid a recession. Complementing
recent work on Secular Stagnation and on fiscal policy during liquidity traps, we use an
overlapping generations New Keynesian model with borrowing constraints to explore how
distortionary taxes can be used to circumvent a persistent economic slump, by raising
the full-employment equilibrium real interest rate so that it becomes achievable when the
nominal interest rate zero lower bound is binding. We propose a wealth redistributive fiscal
policy, by taxing labor income and reducing consumption or capital income taxes, leading
to a contraction of savings that triggers an increase of the natural rate of interest1. We
compare our results with an alternative approach in recent literature based on emulating
inflation in consumer prices using an increasing path of consumption taxes, so that the
intertemporal condition allows an achievable negative natural rate of interest to neutralize
a liquidity trap.
1Full-employment equilibrium real interest rate.
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1.1 Introduction
During a liquidity trap, when inflation is low and the zero lower bound for nominal
interest rates prevents the real interest rate to reach its full employment level, short
term monetary policy may lose effectiveness.
To circumvent a liquidity trap, standard fiscal policy prescriptions in the litera-
ture have been based on Keynesian increases of public expenditures and tax cuts
to stimulate demand2 , and thus increase inflation, allowing for a reduction of the
real interest rate towards the natural rate of interest3. More recently, Correia et al.
[16] proposed an alternative approach based on the use of distortionary taxes, with
”no need to use inefficient policies such as wasteful public spending or future com-
mitments to low interest rates”. To allow a first best solution compatible with a
negative natural rate of interest when the zero lower bound for nominal interest
rates is binding, their recipe consists of emulating the role of higher consumer price
inflation, by a stable increase in consumption taxes. They use a standard single
agent New Keynesian model, where a slump is by construction temporary.
In this paper we also inspect how fiscal policy based on distortionary taxation may
circumvent a liquidity trap, but in the context of a permanent slump. Our approach
is based on the recent Secular Stagnation literature, in particular on the work of
Eggertsson and Mehrotra [21], to which we add a module of distortionary taxes.
We use their proposed three generations OLG model, where the natural rate of
interest may be persistently negative. In contrast with the inflation emulation fiscal
policy type proposed by Correia et al. [16], that increases gross consumption prices
through an increase of consumption taxes to allow a model first-best solution, the
distortionary taxation prescription to avoid a liquidity trap in a permanent slump
2Besides other non-fiscal approaches, namely the one proposed by Eggertsson and Woodford
[23] where the central bank commits to keep interest rates at a lower level even after a recession
resulting from a liquidity trap is over.
3The natural rate of interest has been defined in the literature as the equilibrium full-
employment real interest rate.
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using the model proposed by Eggertsson and Mehrotra [21] is based on a wealth
redistribution mechanism from an endowed middle aged generation, to young credit
constrained households, and to the older generation living at the same time. An
increase of income taxes on the middle-age would reduce their net available funds
to consume and to save, consequently4 triggering an increase of the natural rate of
interest to a higher stable level. If the proceeds from this tax increase are used to
reduce the consumption tax, then the borrowing constrained younger households,
as well as the old, would be able to consume more.
Interestingly, although this paper and the one of Correia et al. [16] both use dis-
tortionary taxation to allow first best, full-employment solutions to circumvent the
potential damages of a liquidity trap, the prescriptions are reversed. Correia et al.
[16] neutralize the effects of the zero lower bound to achieve negative real inter-
est rate levels, by inducing inflation in consumer prices, the ones that matter for
intertemporal decisions, with an increasing path of consumption taxes over time,
simultaneously reducing labor taxes such that producer price inflation is kept at
zero. They use a single agent standard New Keynesian model, with no borrow-
ing constraints, where a slump is by construction transitory. In contrast, in our
model there are three types of households, where the younger generation is credit
constrained. We use distortionary taxation to increase the natural rate of interest
to an achievable level, instead of neutralizing obstacles to achieve a negative level.
Instead of inducing inflation in consumer prices to achieve negative real interest
rates, our prescription is wealth redistributive in order to increase the natural rate
of interest. The fiscal policy we propose could be implemented with lump-sum taxes
and transfers, from middle age to young and old agents. Lump-sum taxation is then
effective in our heterogeneous agents world with borrowing constraints, but not in a
standard single agent New Keynesian framework. Last but not least, we propose an
4assuming a standard context where the derivative of excess savings with respect to the real
interest rate is positive. Excess savings being defined as the difference between loan supply and
demand.
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increase of labor taxes to contract savings and increase the natural rate of interest,
allowing also for a reduction of consumption taxes to the relative benefit of younger
and older agents; in contrast with a reversed prescription by Correia et al. [16] based
on increasing consumption taxes and reducing labor taxation.
This chapter is then organized as follows. In the next section we inspect how dis-
tortionary taxes may affect the natural rate of interest, by using a general version
of the model introduced by Eggertsson and Mehrotra [21] with Constant Relative
Risk Aversion household preferences. We show that emulating inflation with a sta-
ble increasing path of consumption taxes would not be able to increase the natural
rate of interest back to positive ground on a stable basis, although it could be ef-
fective in the short term, but only when the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
is greater than one. In addition, we show that the fiscal policy at the core of this
chapter, based on taxing income of middle age households, is effective in the short
and long run, ensuring an increase of the natural rate of interest to a stable level
irrespectively of the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution5. Without loss of gen-
erality, we assume EIS6 is equal to one through the rest of the chapter because it
allows closed-form expressions in particular for the equilibrium real interest rate.
We then use log-utility of consumption preferences to inspect the role of each fiscal
instruments in avoiding a liquidity trap by sustaining the natural rate of interest
at positive levels. As an example, we present closed-form solutions for the changes
required for each tax in order to offset the impact of deleveraging shocks on the
natural rate of interest.
In the third section we introduce nominal prices and endogenous rigid wages to model
a Secular Stagnation equilibrium as in Eggertsson and Mehrotra [21]. Capital and
a tax on capital income are introduced in the last section. We inspect the role
of distortionary taxation in avoiding a stable recession, driven in this model by a
5Same assumption as before about the slope of excess savings with respect to real interest rate.
6EIS is the acronym of Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution
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deflation mechanism that prevents a timely reduction of nominal rigid wages, that
triggers an increase of real wages to a stable level away from the full-employment
flexible wage, thus dragging the economy into a persistent recession. We remind[21]
that monetary policy can ensure the existence of a full-employment equilibrium, but
cannot by itself avoid its coexistence with a Secular Stagnation one, to which the
economy can transit, namely during a deleveraging shock, if fiscal policy is not used
in a sufficiently assertive way. Adequate fiscal policy measures based on distortionary
taxation promoting the expansion of aggregate demand, possibly combined with the
contraction of aggregate supply, may effectively prevent the economy to fall into a
slump, or ensure that it transits out of one.
Reducing consumption and capital income taxes expand aggregate demand, which
combined with an increase of labor taxes, may raise the natural rate of interest, even-
tually to achievable levels altogether neutralizing a stable recession. Furthermore,
and reminding the Paradox of Toil [20], a demand expansion can be combined with a
supply contraction that in the short term can boost inflation and force the transition
from a stable recession with deflation, to a positive inflation full-employment equi-
librium. This can be achieved by increasing the labor tax on firms that would lead
firms to reduce nominal wages in order to sustain profitability. The nominal wage
rigidity prevents the nominal wage full adjustment triggering a further increase of
real wages which contracts supply even further, thus creating a positive pressure on
inflation that may bring back the economy to a higher employment level. The results
presented in this chapter are related to a closed economy, although the combination
alternatives of distortionary taxes to avoid a permanent slump, for example by using
a reduction of the tax on capital income instead of the consumption tax, suggest
that this framework could be applied to other contexts, namely to open economy
frameworks.
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1.2 Secular Stagnation model with distortionary
taxes
In this section we briefly describe and derive a Secular Stagnation overlapping three
generations model with real prices proposed by Eggertsson and Mehrotra [21], to
which we add a module of distortionary taxes. The aim is to find a general expres-
sion for the impact of tax changes on the natural rate of interest, so that it can
be kept at a sufficiently high achievable level, for example during a deleveraging
shock. We use the Implicit Function Theorem to derive a general expression for the
partial derivatives of the natural rate of interest with respect to policy instruments,
to explore the effectiveness of fiscal policy options in avoiding a liquidity trap, by
manipulating the natural rate of interest level. In particular we show that inflation
emulation fiscal approach based on an increasing path of consumption taxes pro-
posed by Correia et al. [16] is not effective in counteracting a persistent recession in
the context of our model.
1.2.1 Model with labor and consumption taxes
We use a 3 periods overlapping generations model[21] that allows for steady state
equilibria with persistent negative real interest rates, when population growth is low
enough or when borrowing constraints of the younger generation increase. House-
holds go through three stages of life: young, middle aged and old. The young
generation borrows Byt from the middle-aged; the middle-aged save −Bmt by lend-
ing to the young and to the government, and pay back their loans to the previous
generation, the old. The old receive back with interest what they have lent to
the young and the Government when middle aged. Consumption of the young Cyt ,
middle age Cmt , and old C
o
t is taxed by a consumption tax τ
c
t . It is assumed that
income is only earned by the middle aged through firm profits Zt, and labor WtLt
6
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which is taxed with τ lt . Borrowing is constrained by a binding debt limit Dt faced
by the young, exogenously determined. The Government budget is balanced. The







Et{U(Cyt ) + βU(Cmt+1) + β2U(Cot+2)} (1.1)





(1 + τ ct+1)C
m





(1 + τ ct+2)C
o
t+2 = −(1 + rt+1)Bmt+1 (1.4)
(1 + rt)B
y
t ≤ Dt, an exogenous borrowing limit. (1.5)
Where U(C) is a constant elasticity of inter-temporal substitution utility function
expressed by U(c) = c
1−σ
1−σ . We assume that the borrowing constraint of the young
generation is binding, or (1 + rt)B
y
t = Dt. In this credit constrained environment,
although the amount borrowed by a young agent does not directly depend on any




, the consumption of the young will inversely directly depend on the level
of consumption taxation, given by:








So unless an increase of consumption taxes were followed by a sufficient reduction
of equilibrium real interest rates, they would result in a consumption contraction
of younger agents. The same could be said about the old, but in this case with no
relation with current equilibrium interest rate, since their consumption depends on
savings from previous period, net of consumption taxes:
(1 + τ ct )C
o
t = −(1 + rt−1)Bmt−1 (1.7)
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Consequently an increase of consumption taxation, as proposed by Correia et al. [16],
in this environment would lead to a contraction of consumption of the younger and
older generations, with an expansion of middle age consumption, assuming stable
government spending and full-employment. A negative welfare effect if we assume
that middle age are wealthier than the young and old.
As the consumption of the old is determined by previous period equilibrium, uncon-
strained middle age consumption is determined by the model’s Euler equation given
by:








1 + τ ct+1
1 + τ ct
(1.8)
This Euler equation is similar to the one derived by Correia et al. [16], and would
suggest that an increase of consumption taxation could have an increasing effect on
the equilibrium real interest rate as well. Next we show why this is not necessarily the
case in our borrowing constrained economy where persistent recessions are possible.
1.2.2 Increasing the natural rate of interest
The model is completely determined with the budget constraints, the previous Euler
equation, and the loan market equilibrium equation given by:
Byt = −Bmt (1.9)
whereByt = L
d
t is the demand for loans by the young generation, which in equilibrium
must be equal to the supply of loans from the middle aged −Bmt = Lst . Let Excess
Savings be a continuous and differential function for r ∈]− 1,+∞[ defined as St =
Lst−Ldt , such that at loan market equilibrium St = 0. Using the the Implicit Function
Theorem we can explicit the partial derivative of the natural rate of interest with
8
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respect to any tax parameter:
Ldt = L
s









We now inspect each component of the previous expression.
i) Loan Demand
Total borrowing in period t is equal to the total demand for loans, and is given by






where Bgt is government borrowing per middle age household, Nt is the size of the
young generation at time t, and Nt−1 is the size of middle age generation also at














where 1 + gt = Nt/Nt−1, and gt is population growth at time t. In that case
a reduction of the borrowing limit of the young would cause a contraction of loan
demand, that could be counterbalanced by an increase of public debt. Assuming that
government borrowing is exogenously determined, loan demand would not depend on






Moreover, loan demand is a negative function of the real interest rate, with a strictly
negative partial derivative given by:
∂Ldt
∂rt










Because we assumed that government borrowing Bgt is an exogenous parameter of
this economy, we can already simplify the general expression for the partial derivative
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of the natural rate of interest with respect to tax instruments to conclude that their














As we show later, we can realistically assume that excess savings in the denominator
is an increasing function of the real interest rate. In that case any tax change having
a contraction effect on loan supply, would raise the natural rate of interest. We then
derive loan supply.
ii) Loan Supply
Firms in the model are in perfect competition and hire labor to maximize profits on
a period by period basis. For now there are no distortionary taxes on firms. The
firm problem is given by:
Zt = max
Lt
Yt −WtLt s.t. Yt = F (Lt) strictly concave (1.15)
The solutions for Wt and Zt are given by:
Wt = FL(Lt) and Zt = F (Lt)− LtFL(Lt) (1.16)
We then get a present value expression for consumption of middle age and old
by combining constraints (1.3) and (1.4) with the borrowing constraint (1.5), and
replacing the solutions for Wt and Zt:
(1 + τ ct )C
m
t +




= F (Lt)− τwt FL(Lt)Lt −Dt−1 (1.17)
Loans supply is derived by replacing expressions for middle age and old consumption
10
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given by (1.8) and (1.7) in previous equation:
Lst = −Bmt =
[














We see directly from this expression that an increase of labor taxation on middle
age is enough to trigger a contraction of loan supply, independently of the elasticity
of inter-temporal substitution EIS ≡ 1
σ
. By realistically assuming that excess sav-
ings increases with the real interest rate 7 a permanent increase of labor taxation
on the middle age would then trigger a permanent increase of the natural rate of
interest. Consumption taxes would have to be reduced in order to keep government
budget balanced, in current and following periods. Furthermore, if we assumed that
consumption taxes would remain constant in the present and future, then loan sup-
ply would not depend on consumption taxes, but on labor taxes alone which would
become the only fiscal instrument directly determining loan supply:
Lst =
[











An inflation emulation policy with a stable increase of consumption taxes can here
be given by a commitment to increase consumption taxation in the next period.
The impact on loan supply depends on EIS, as can also be observed directly from
expression (1.18). If EIS ≡ 1
σ
< 1, then committing to increase consumption taxa-
tion in the next period expands loan supply in the current period, and reduces the
natural rate of interest. With a low elasticity of inter-temporal substitution, the
income effect related to an expected increase of consumption taxation in the next
period would lead to an increase of savings in the current period to sustain future
7As we show later, a sufficient condition for a positive slope of excess savings St with respect




exceed the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution 1σ . This is a reasonable assumption in developed
economies, given the standard estimations of EIS usually above 0.5[27]. If EIS is close to 1, or
for low level of government debt Bg this becomes a trivial assumption.
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consumption. This effect would here prevail over a substitution effect resulting from
the fact that consumption in the future would become more costly than current
consumption. The opposite is true if EIS > 1, which may not be the most usual
case taking the results of Havranek et al. [27]. Then a substitution effect would
prevail with a commitment to increase consumption taxes in the future, leading to
a contraction of current savings, and to a consequent increase of the natural rate of
interest. But in this case, for the budget to balance during the next period labor
taxes would have to decrease, creating a negative pressure on the natural rate of
interest as seen before, that would need a further commitment to increase consump-
tion taxation in the future, and so on. This fiscal policy, besides being effective
only for EIS > 1, would force an unimplementable recurrent policy commitment
from the government, with no opportunity for reversion in the context of the current
model were a recession may be persistent.
iii) Slope of Excess Savings with respect to the real interest rate: ∂St
∂rt
> 0?






































EIS > 1 then ∂St
∂rt
is positive. If EIS < 1 then loan supply is negative sloped with











is valid through the rest of the paper. This implies
that the sign of the partial derivative of the natural rate of interest with respect to
any tax instrument is opposite to the sign of the partial derivative of loans supply
8 ∂St
∂rt
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with respect to that same instrument. If we further discard from our analysis policy
measures supported by increasing (or decreasing) paths of consumption taxes, since
we checked them previously, we can assume without loss of generality, and for the
purpose of algebraic tractability, that EIS = 1, and U(C) = Log(C).
1.2.3 Offsetting a deleveraging shock
In this section we explore each fiscal instrument in terms of its role in offsetting any
factor dragging down the natural rate of interest. We start with labor taxation on
households.
i) Labor tax on households : τ l
For σ = 1, a closed-form expression for the natural rate of interest can be derived
directly from loan market equilibrium given by equation (1.12):











Where we assume that output is now expressed by Yt = L
α
t , and in particular, full-
employment output is given by Y ft = L̄
α when the equilibrium real interest rate is
equal to the natural rate of interest rnt . We can observe directly from expression
(1.21) that the natural rate of interest decreases with the contraction of aggregate
borrowing, either because the Government needs to reduce public borrowing Bgt ,
or because of higher credit constraints imposed on young households through lower
borrowing limits Dt. If the government is prevented to increase public debt, then
a sufficient increase of labor taxation τ lt could offset the impact of a deleveraging
shock, by triggering a contraction of aggregate savings to prevent the natural rate of
interest from falling to non-achievable (negative) levels. In particular, to counteract
the impact of a deleveraging shock, from a reduction of public borrowing, on the
13
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natural rate of interest, the required change of labor tax would be:










and to offset the impact on the natural rate of interest of a deleveraging shock, due
to a lower borrowing limit of young households, the required change of labor tax
would be9:














ii) Consumption tax : τ c
With no capital in the model, aggregate demand is the sum of aggregate consumption
Ct and government spending Gt. If the government is prevented to spend more than
an exogenous upper limit G, then consumption Ct cannot be lower than C
f = Y f−G
in order to ensure full-employment. By assuming that public spending is exogenously
determined we next explore how to sustain consumption at its full-employment level,
combining distortionary taxes so that the natural rate of interest is also sustained
at viable levels. Total consumption in period t is given by:







Combining the previous expressions with young and old budget constraints (1.6),(1.7),























Consumption is directly determined by the borrowing constraints of the government
9This is a steady state expression.
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and the young generation. Because the borrowing constraints are binding, consump-
tion inversely depends on consumption tax. Then, with a contraction of the bor-
rowing limit of younger households, the effective fiscal instrument that sustains the
consumption level from falling is τ c, if the real interest rate is to be sustained too.
Further below, and considering the government budget constraint, we will show that
the change in labor income tax required to prevent the real interest rate from falling
after a deleveraging shock is consistent with the required reduction of the consump-
tion tax that prevents consumption level from falling, given the same deleveraging
shock.
The consumption tax changes required to sustain the same level of consumption,
given a reduction of households borrowing limit, or of government debt, assuming the

























Directly from expressions above, to counteract a deleveraging shock, the fiscal ad-
justment would need to be stronger for governments that spend more.
iii) Government Budget constraint
Until now we used two approaches to offset the impact of a deleveraging shock re-
spectively on the natural rate of interest, and on consumption. The first one is based
on an increase of labor taxes to sustain the natural rate of interest at an achievable
level, and the second on reducing consumption taxes to sustain consumption at its
full-employment level. Both approaches are equivalent given the budget constraint
15
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of the Government, given by:











t (Yt −Gt) + ατ ltYt = (τ ct + ατ lt )Yt − τ ctGt (1.28)
By replacing the above expression (1.28) in (1.27) we obtain an alternative expression
for the budget constraint connecting the fiscal instruments. We call this equation




ατ lt + τ
c
t















ατ l + τ c









Imagine there is a worsening of the credit constraints in this economy. If the Gov-
ernment is prevented to increase spending as well as public debt, then, in order
to sustain the real interest rate at the same level, savings would have to contract
through an increase of labor taxation on the middle age. The Government bud-
get rule would then imply a reduction of the consumption tax, which would be the
same required to sustain consumption a the same level, if the real interest rate would
remain unchanged.
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1.3 Counteracting a stable recession with distor-
tionary taxes
In this section we introduce the notion of persistent recession based on the Secular
Stagnation model proposed by Eggertsson and Mehrotra [21], and inspect the role
of fiscal policy based on distortionary taxation to keep (or to bring back) the econ-
omy to a full-employment equilibrium. In order to prevent the economy to reach
its first best full-employment allocation we introduce nominal prices in the model,
and the possibility of a binding zero lower bound for the nominal interest rate that
can prevent a negative natural of interest to be achieved, thus triggering a recession.
We derive a simple sufficient condition to maintain a first best equilibrium possible,
by ensuring consistency between monetary policy targets and distortionary taxa-
tion based fiscal policy. Then we introduce nominal wage rigidities that allow the
appearance of a second stable equilibrium in the model, in this case a persistent
recession. We revisit the previous sufficient condition to sustain the economy at its
first best allocation, and also inspect how an adequate use of distortionary taxes,
in particular a labor tax on firms, can help the economy move from a slump to a
full-employment equilibrium.
1.3.1 Monetary and fiscal policy consistency







Et{log(Cyt ) + β log(Cmt+1) + β2 log(Cot+2)} (1.31)





















t+2 = −(1 + it+1)Pt+1Bmt+1 (1.34)
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And an exogenous borrowing limit: (1+it)PtB
y
t 6 Pt+1Dt. Using the Fisher equation
1 + it = (1 + rt)
Pt+1
Pt
, the Euler Equation has the same expression as before, as well
as the expressions for the real interest rate, and for the Government budget rule.







(1 + τ ct+1)











(1 + τ ct+1)










)φπ−1}, where φπ > 1, then by using the Fisher equation we get the following
expression for the real interest rate:














Where Π∗ and i∗ are the monetary policy targets for gross inflation and the nominal
interest rate. Note that when the zero lower bound is binding, the real interest
rate is just a function of the current inflation level, and does not depend on any
monetary policy instrument given by inflation and nominal interest rate targets.
From the previous expression, and given the nominal interest rate zero lower bound,
as well as this specific Taylor rule, a real interest rate lower bound is given by:





= 1 + rkink (1.37)
If the natural rate of interest rnt is lower than the real interest rate lower bound
then it would not be achievable, and a first best full-employment allocation would
not be possible (see figure 1.1). rkink then works like a lower bound for the natural
rate of interest to allow a full-employment equilibrium in this economy. Another
sufficient condition to ensure that the natural rate of interest is achievable is to use
the implicit monetary policy target real interest rate level r∗ as a lower bound for
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Figure 1.1: The Natural rate of Interest and the Zero Lower Bound
monetary policy target real interest rate. Assuming that φπ ≥ 1 then r∗ ≥ rkink:











−1 ≤ 1 + r∗, for i∗ ≥ 0, φπ ≥ 1 (1.38)
If the natural rate of interest rnt , determined by and adequate fiscal policy selection
of distortionary tax levels, is greater than the monetary policy implicit real interest
rate target r∗ = 1+i
∗
Π∗
, then a full-employment equilibrium is possible. In other words,
fiscal and monetary policy are complements to fulfill full-employment conditions.
From an aggregate demand perspective we can reach the same conclusion about
consistency between monetary and fiscal policy to allow first-best full-employment
allocations. Note that aggregate demand Y dt (Πt) can be expressed by:
Πt > Π
kink: Y dt =
1
1 + τ ct
[







Πt ≤ Πkink: Y dt =
1
1 + τ ct
[










≤ Π∗. Also, Y kink = Y (Πkink) is the upper bound of the set
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of admissible aggregate demand levels. Then, if the natural rate of interest has an
achievable level, rnt ({τt}) ≥ rkink(Π∗, i∗), then Y dt ({τt}) = Y
f
t ≤ Y kink(Π∗, i∗), and a
full employment is allowed in this economy. Note that aggregate demand expands
with lower consumption taxes, an intuitive statement in this credit constrained en-
vironment. Note in addition that if inflation is above Πkink, then aggregate demand
Y dt is a negative function of inflation, and depends on monetary policy targets. Ag-
gregate demand is a negative function of inflation because it is a negative function
of the real interest rate 10 , and the real interest rate in this case increases with
inflation by means of the Taylor Rule as seen above. Otherwise, if inflation is be-
low Πkink then aggregate demand becomes a positive function of inflation, since in
this case the gross real interest rate is the inverse of gross inflation. More deflation
means higher real interest rates and lower demand. Furthermore, the lower segment
of aggregate demand does not depend on any monetary policy instrument.
An example: sustaining the economy at full-employment
Imagine that for a given fiscal policy {τh} and a binding borrowing limit Dh the
natural rate of interest rnt ({τh}, Dh) is achievable, such that rnt ({τh}, Dh) ≡ rnh ≥
r∗ = r(Π∗, i∗), where r∗ is an implicit monetary policy real interest rate target. Let’s
further assume that rnh = r
∗. If a deleveraging shock occurs and D falls from Dh to
Dl, then to maintain the economy on a full-employment steady state it is sufficient
to find a fiscal policy {τl} so that the resulting natural rate of interest is sustained
at the same level equal to the monetary target real interest rate.





∗ ⇐⇒ 1 + τ
c
l








10Given the same assumptions for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, excess savings
is positively sloped with respect to the real interest rate, and consequently current demand is
negatively sloped with respect to the same variable.
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Which is equivalent to:







and ∂τ c =
∂D
Dh
(1 + τ ch) (1.42)
If τ ch = τ
l
h = 20% and labor share α = 0.7, then a 5% reduction of D would have to be
offset by an increase of the labor tax from 20% to 26%, together with a reduction of
consumption tax from 20% to 14%. A combination of fiscal and monetary policy may
attenuate the fiscal effort needed to offset a deleveraging shock in order to sustain
employment (see figure 1.2). But only fiscal policy may prevent the appearance of
Figure 1.2: Allowing a First Best Solution with Fiscal and Monetary Policy
a secular stagnation steady state to where the economy can be dragged if fiscal and
monetary policy agents are not assertive enough. We will see how next, when wages
are sticky.
1.3.2 Sticky wages, stable recessions, and labor tax on firms
We now introduce in the model sticky wages and a wage tax on firms τw. the tax
works similarly to the labor tax on households in the way it reduces their net income
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and savings, having the same kind of impact on the natural rate of interest. But τw
may also play a relevant role to avoid or to leave a secular stagnation in the presence
of wage rigidities. The firm problem is now given by:
Zt = max
Lt

















and zt = (1− α)Yt (1.44)
While the aggregate demand expression given by (1.39) and (1.40) remains un-
changed with the introducuction of this tax, close-form expressions for the real
interest rate and the Government budget rule are given by:











ατ lwt + τ
c
t
1 + τ ct
(1.46)





is a labor tax index combining τ l and τw in a single expression,
which besides acting similarly to τ lt in sustaining the natural rate of interest, can
play a relevant role in leaving a Secular Stagnation by interfering directly on the
aggregate supply side of this economy, that we describe next.
A wage rigidity is introduced in the model such that households will not accept










whereas the nominal wage will always be greater or equal than the flexible labor
22
CHAPTER 1. DISTORTIONARY TAXATION IN STABLE RECESSIONS
full-employment nominal wage:
Wt = max{W̃t, Ptwflext } (1.48)
With an equivalent expression for aggregate supply given by:
Yt = min
{












Note that, from the wage equilibrium equation (1.44), an increase of the labor
tax on firms triggers a downward pressure on the nominal wage to sustain firms
profits. But if the full-employment nominal wage cannot be fully achieved because
of the nominal rigidity, then supply will adjust to a sub-employment level. The
corresponding steady state expression is given by:









which is an increasing function of inflation for negative inflation levels, and does
not depend on any fiscal instrument, assuming that a perpetual constant change
of the labor tax on firms, although theoretically viable, is unrealistic. Note that
the steady state expression for aggregate supply does not depend on any monetary
policy target either. And neither the lower segment of aggregate demand given by
expression (1.40).
Figure 1.3 shows a graphical representation of a Secular Stagnation equilibrium, de-
termined by the intersection of the lower segments of aggregate demand and supply.
This equilibrium is stable, as described in detail by Eggertsson and Mehrotra [21],
by assuming that the wage rigidity is sufficiently high in order to ensure that the
slope of the lower segment of aggregate supply is smaller than the slope of lower
aggregate demand. Figure 1.3 also shows that monetary policy cannot neutralize a
stable recession, although it can provide the economy with a full-employment equi-
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Figure 1.3: Secular Stagnation Equilibrium
librium by allowing an achievable negative natural rate of interest with an adequate
positive inflation target.
In fact, only fiscal policy is able to neutralize a stable recession in this economy.
The fiscal mechanism to counteract a Secular Stagnation equilibrium needs to boost
inflation, since any stable recession is characterized by an equilibrium in deflation.
This inflation boost can be achieved by fiscally expanding demand, contracting
supply, or a combination of both.
i) Aggregate Demand expansion to counteract a stable recession
Aggregate supply in steady state does not depend on any fiscal instrument, then
only a sufficiently assertive permanent demand expansion can clear a recession from
the set of available equilibria, thus forcing a permanent transition to a stable full-
employment state.
Graphically it is easy to see that a demand expansion must be big enough so that
the lower segment of aggregate demand does not intersect aggregate supply, which
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is the same to say that the lower segment of aggregate demand must achieve a full-
employment level for an inflation level smaller than zero. A sufficient condition is
to ensure that the natural rate of interest becomes positive and achievable, corre-
sponding to a negative inflation intersection of the lower aggregate demand segment
with full-employment output. In addition, a negative natural rate of interest in this
economy implies the existence of a Secular Stagnation equilibrium 11. The suffi-
cient aggregate demand expansion is achieved by a reduction of the consumption
tax given by12:














The sufficiency of this result presumes that the resulting natural rate of interest
level rn is achievable from a monetary policy standpoint, or r∗ ≤ rn.
ii) Aggregate Supply contraction to counteract a stable recession: Paradox of Toil
A negative natural rate of interest implies the existence of a Secular Stagnation
equilibrium in the model. But a full-employment equilibrium may coexist if the
natural rate of interest is achievable by an adequate monetary policy such that
1 + r∗ < 1 + rn. From Figure(1.4) we can observe that, in this model a necessary
and sufficient condition for the existence of a secular stagnation equilibrium is that
(i) the lower segment of aggregate demand is steeper than the lower segment of
aggregate supply[21], and that (ii) the inflation level corresponding to short term
aggregate supply determined at full employment, Πs,ft , is lower than the inflation
level corresponding to aggregate demand determined at full employment13, Πd,ft =
1
1+rnt
. Πs,ft is determined by equation (1.49), and the existing condition for a secular
11as the lower segment of aggregate demand intersects full employment output at a positive
inflation level, which by construction of the model ensures an intersection with the lower segment
of aggregate supply.
12where the subscript ss means Secular Stagnation steady state equilibrium, and f means full-
employment steady state.
13Πd,ft is by construction equal to the inverse of the gross natural rate of interest.
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Figure 1.4: One period aggregate supply contraction shock














It is possible to force a transition from a stable recession to a stable full-employment
equilibrium, with a transitory contraction of aggregate supply, enough to clear at
least for one period the possibility of a Secular Stagnation equilibrium (Figure 1.4).
Using a similar mechanism as the previous one for aggregate demand, it is sufficient
to contract aggregate supply by increasing the labor tax on firms, such that the lower
segment of aggregate supply, given by expression (1.49), intersects full-employment
output at a gross inflation level greater than the intersection of the lower aggregate
demand segment with full-employment output, given by a gross inflation level equal
to the inverse of the gross natural rate of interest 1
1+rnt
. This condition is directly




























Note also that the natural rate of interest may remain constant if the increase of
labor tax on firms15 is compensated from a budget perspective by a reduction of the
labor tax on households so that the consumption tax remains unchanged.
Similarly to Correia et al. [16] a liquidity trap is resolved with an inflation boost,
bringing back the economy to a full-employment first best equilibrium from a stable
recession, but with a reverse usage of distortionary taxes in this credit constrained
closed economy environment.
iii) A fiscal rule to prevent a secular stagnation
Note that the previous condition (1.53) can be used as a fiscal rule to prevent an
economy to fall into a persistent recession, when a full-employment equilibrium and
a secular stagnation recessions are, both, achievable steady state equilibria. When
monetary policy is ineffective this fiscal rule would work like a Taylor rule, but
using fiscal, instead of monetary instruments. In our economy, a secular stagnation
equilibrium given by Yt < Y
f , is driven by a stable deflation steady state where,






f if Πt < 1 (1.54)
Combining the previous expression with the condition given by equation (1.53), our
15Note also that the existence of a secular stagnation equilibrium implies that the left-hand side
of the equation is greater than one.
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fiscal rule can then be expressed by:
Πt ≥ 1⇒ τwt ≤ τwt−1 (1.55)
Πt < 1⇒ τwt = (1 + τwt−1)
Πγt
1 + rnt
− 1 > τwt−1 (1.56)
This means that the government commits to increase the labor tax on firms if
inflation becomes negative, in order to ensure that real wages do not increase above
the flexible wage level, thus sustaining full employment, all in all assuming that the
natural rate of interest is known and achievable.
iv) Welfare implications
The two main mechanisms to move our economy out of a slump may be welfare
improving for all agents. An aggregate demand expansion via a consumption tax
reduction may clear the secular stagnation equilibrium, altogether not requiring an
increase of labor taxes from a Government budget equilibrium standpoint. From
the Government budget constraint given by equation(1.27), a sufficient decrease
in consumption taxes can increase aggregate demand to a full-employment level
without the need to reduce labor taxes. If the natural rate of interest in this economy
is achievable, then the three types of agents would be better off.
The same result may be obtained using the fiscal rule, if the increase of the labor
tax on firms is combined with a reduction of the labor tax on households, in order
to sustain the labor tax index τ lwt , as well as the natural rate of interest which we
assume achievable, at the same level16.
16Nevertheless, if the natural rate of interest must be increased to be achievable (or sustained
at an achievable level during a credit shock), then the combination of increasing labor taxes with
decreasing consumption taxes is welfare improving for the old that benefit from the consumption
tax reduction. The welfare implications for the young and middle age should be further inspected.
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1.3.3 Return on Capital Income tax
Introducing capital and tax on capital in the model does not qualitatively change
the fiscal policy options to counteract a persistent recession we have derived until
that point. But by having an impact similar to the consumption tax in expanding
aggregate demand, reducing the tax on capital can be an effective alternative to a
reduction of consumption taxes when further promoting a consumption expansion is
not a desirable outcome. Although reducing the tax on capital has also an expanding
impact on aggregate supply, the impact on demand prevails, so that the net effect
is an increase of the natural rate of interest, and of equilibrium inflation.
We use a version with capital of the previous model[21] with a tax on capital,
together with all the other taxes already presented in this chapter. We introduce
distortionary taxes including the tax on capital income in the budget constraints of
the middle age and old, which are now given by:
(1 + τ ct+1)C
m






(1 + τ ct+2)C
o
t+2 = −(1 + rt+1)Bmt+1 +Kt+1(1− δ) (1.58)
and the labor tax on firms is still considered in the firm problem, now given by:
Zt = max
Lt,Kt











and rkt = (1 − α)AtLαtK−αt = (1 − α) YtKt . From
the return on capital expression we can directly observe that a reduction of the tax









Aggregate demand expands when if the tax on capital income decreases. This can be
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directly observed from the following expression of aggregate demand in real terms:
Y dt =
1






















Regarding aggregate supply, its expressions is equal to the one derived previously
and given by expression (1.49). But now full employment output is given by:





















The difference lies on the aggregate supply expression for positive inflation levels
which is not constant, and expands when τ k decreases, leading also to an aggregate
supply expansion when inflation is negative. Although a reduction of the tax on
capital income has an expanding impact on both aggregate supply and demand,
the impact on demand prevails. The resulting impact on inflation, employment
and the natural rate of interest are qualitatively similar to the ones derived for
the consumption tax, being an available adequate alternative to this instrument in
counteracting a persistent recession.
1.4 Final remarks
In this Chapter we formalized the role of distortionary taxation in avoiding a stable
recession characterized by the Secular Stagnation framework proposed by Eggerts-
son and Mehrotra [21], based on a three generations OLG model with borrowing
constraints. We compare our results with the ones obtained by Correia et al. [16]
that propose a solution based on the same set of distortionary taxes in a standard
single agent New Keynesian model without borrowing constraints, to counteract a
liquidity trap that is by construction temporary. We find reversed results. Our
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mechanism is based on a wealth re-distributive policy using distortionary taxes to
increase the natural rate of interest so that it becomes achievable given the mon-
etary policy targets, by increasing labor taxes on the middle age employed and
redistributing the tax proceeds to the population in general by reducing consump-
tion tax. Instead, Correia et al. [16] emulate inflation in consumer prices using an
increasing path of consumption taxes, so that the intertemporal condition allows
an achievable negative natural rate of interest, and the liquidity trap is neutralized.
We use the same fiscal toolbox with different approaches. We increase the natural
rate of interest to a level consistent with monetary policy effectiveness, instead of
temporarily allowing a first best solution compatible with a negative natural rate of
interest.
As an alternative to the standard fiscal policy prescriptions to counteract an eco-
nomic downturn, based on Keynesian increases of public expenditures, more public
debt and tax cuts to stimulate demand17, and complementing the papers referenced
above, the main purpose of our analysis is to show how fiscal policy based on dis-
tortionary taxation can be effective in avoiding persistent recessions, in particular
when increasing public expenditures and debt are not policy options available.
17Besides other non-fiscal approaches, namely the one proposed by Eggertsson and Woodford
[23] where the central bank commits to keep interest rates at a lower level even after a recession
resulting from a liquidity trap is over.
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Chapter 2
Age Milestones and Low Interest
Rates, an Analytic approach
Abstract
Major age milestones like the age of first job, retirement age, or life expectancy, bounding
relevant economic periods in a persons’ life, have been changing substantially during the
last decades. In parallel real interest rates have been significantly declining in relevant
world economies, reaching stable negative levels in some cases. We propose an analytic
approach to relate those two phenomena by using an overlapping multi-generations model
to find expressions for real interest rate elasticities to age parameters. The model formal-
izes the mechanisms supporting the relation between interest rates and age, sheds light
on the relative importance of each age milestone in explaining changes of real interest
rates, and how other factors like elasticity of inter-temporal substitution, population and
productivity growth, inter-generational altruism, as well as a social security system, may
mitigate or amplify those changes.
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2.1 Introduction
During the last decades, the age structure of the population in some of World’s most
relevant economies has changed significantly. For example, although Life expectancy
at birth increased by approximately ten years since the 70’s both in US and EU,
retirement age has declined four and six years respectively, contributing to raise the
need to save in those economies (Figure 3.1). Furthermore, the recent economic
crisis tended to affect the average age of first job as firms tend to postpone hiring
as a way to adjust down employment level, which could lead to an increase of the
borrowing needs of this population segment.
Changes in age milestones determine many aspects of relevant economic periods of
a persons’ life, which themselves may directly impact real interest rates through
changes of borrowing and savings paths. For example, for a higher effective retire-
ment age, people need to save less for their expected retirement period, leading to a
contraction of savings and a consequent increase in equilibrium real interest rates.
In addition, postponing the age of first job increases the duration of borrowing after
adulthood, pushing interest rates upwards too. Increasing both parameters, age of
retirement and first job, at the same time and by the same amount, although not
changing the duration of the working period, may impact the real interest rate by
affecting borrowing and saving paths, and consequently loan market equilibrium and
real interest rates.
Although the impact of age structure in relevant World economies has been a recur-
rent topic covered in recent literature, in particular to explain the persistent decline
of interest rates, economic stagnation and liquidity traps, there has not yet been
an attempt, to the best of our knowledge, to formally derive the analytic relations
of real interest rates with respect age milestones. The general omission of changing
demographic parameters in most current formal economic models ignores a poten-
tially relevant factor influencing equilibrium conditions, and consequently the type
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Figure 2.1: Life Expectancy and effective Retirement Age: EU and US 1970-2014
and even sign of solutions. For example, an increase of life expectancy can drag
the full-employment equilibrium real interest rate from positive to negative. Since
a negative level may not be achievable when the nominal interest rate zero lower
bound is binding, a first best solution may no more be available in such a model. The
same can happen with operative bequest motives, which may become inoperative,
for example if the retirement age decreases, or life expectancy increases.
The purpose of this paper is to fill out this gap. By merging an age structure frame-
work with an OLG model, we derive tractable algebraic real interest rate elasticity
expressions with respect to each age parameter, to shed light on the demographic
formal mechanisms that influence real interest rates, and inspect in particular the
examples mentioned above. Moreover we provide a straightforward alternative to
heavy computational quantitative models, in order to illustrate the impact of demo-
graphic factors on general economic phenomena.
Ikeda and Saito [29] study the effects of demographic changes on the real interest
rate in Japan by capturing demographic dynamics by exogenous changes of the ratio
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of workers to total population. But most of the literature covering the present topic
use perpetual youth type models inspired by Blanchard and Fischer [7], using transi-
tion probabilities between age groups. This approach, that facilitates aggregation of
individual agents, thus ensuring analytically more tractable life-cycle models, was
adopted, for example, by Carvalho and Ferrero [11] to explain Japan’s persistent
deflation, using transition probabilities from worker to retired, and from retired to
death, and by Carvalho et al. [12] to inspect the mechanisms of how demographics
affect real interest rates. Similarly, Aksoy et al. [2] relate macroeconomic trends
to demographic structure with a model to which they add an additional transi-
tion probability from young to worker, after conducting an empirical study where
they found evidence that differences in generation weight across countries explain
differences among main macro-economic variables.
Nevertheless, transition probabilities in those models tend to be independent of age,
and of time since transition from previous age groups, which makes them less appro-
priate to derive analytic relations between interest rate and explicit age milestones.
This circumstance was recently overcome by Eggertsson and Robbins [22] who used a
quantitative overlapping multi-generations model inspired by the work of Auerbach
and Kotlikoff [3] to investigate the decline of real interest rates in US.
Similarly, we use an overlapping multi-generations model, where most relevant age
milestones are exogenous parameters, allowing to analytically express the real in-
terest rate in terms of age structure changes, surprisingly not affecting algebraic
tractability, in order to shed light on relevant demographic mechanisms that are
dragging down real interest rates.
In what follows, we begin by outlining an overlapping generations deterministic
model in the context of an endowment economy, where agents are economically
active after childhood until their age of life expectancy. The number of generations
of the model depends already on those two age milestones. At the age of adulthood
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agents start borrowing to consume. From the age of first job until retirement they
receive an income in the form of an endowment, with which they pay back their
debt, consume, and save for retirement1. During that working period, at a certain
moment in time agents have payed back their debts and start saving for retirement.
Until that moment agents are borrowers, and after they become savers. The initial
savings age is an endogenous variable of the model. During retirement they use
their accumulated savings to consume. We derive the equilibrium conditions and
aggregate expressions for the main variables of the model, in particular of excess
borrowing, in terms of the real interest rate and age milestones, which becomes zero
for loan market equilibrium.
In the third section we use the excess borrowing expression at loan market equilib-
rium in steady state to formalize the analytic relation between the natural rate of
interest2 and age structure. We formalize the derivatives of real interest rate with
respect to each age parameter, using the partial derivatives of excess borrowing
with respect to age milestones, and to the real interest rate. We find that excess
borrowing decreases with increasing interest rates if the elasticity of inter-temporal
substitution is above a certain acceptable threshold level that depends on the rela-
tive duration of retirement. We use this assumption throughout the paper, so that
the consistent negative slope of excess borrowing with respect to the real interest
rate allows the sign of age milestones elasticities to be determined by the signs of
the partial derivative of excess borrowing with respect to each age parameter.
In the fourth section we introduce intergeneration transfers in the form of bequests
to children, of gifts to parents, and of a pay-as-you-go social security system, as those
concepts are closely related to agents age structure, in particular to the age when
1In our model the age of adulthood and age of first job may be different. After adulthood
and before the age of first job agents have to borrow in order to consume. In the special case
where those two age milestones are set the same, the algebraic expressions are simplified, and the
calibrated outputs are not materially different. An alternative not used in our model to date,
would be to consider endogenous transfers from parents to children during that specific phase of
their lives.
2The natural rate of interest is defined as the full-employment equilibrium real interest rate.
36
CHAPTER 2. AGE MILESTONES AND LOW INTEREST RATES
their children are born. We also analyze how intergeneration transfers parameters
affect the elasticities of real interest rates with respect to age milestones. Finally,
in section five we calibrate a model with endogenous output and capital to quantify
the analytic results of previous sections. We also test the impact of changing capital
depreciation on real interest rate elasticities with respect to age milestones, as well
as the impact of changes in age structure on the capital-output ratio.
As we have already noted, this chapter focuses on the presentation of a framework
that allows to derive formal algebraic relations between real interest rates and age
milestones, in order to inspect the influence of demographic factors in specific eco-
nomic mechanisms. In particular, we use our framework to explore how changing
age structure can switch an altruistic motive from helping children to supporting
parents, or how an increase of life-expectancy, a reduction of retirement age, and
postponing of the age of first job explain the decline of real interest rates, further
quantifying those phenomena. Although we keep our results focus on the demand
side of OLG models, our framework can also be used, for example, to explore secu-
lar stagnation mechanisms driven by demographic factors. In particular, in current
work in progress, we extend our framework with nominal prices, endogenous out-
put, and nominal wage rigidities, where when the natural rate of interest becomes
negative, a second best solution with a sub-optimal stable equilibrium output level
is characterized by an endogenous persistent increase of the age of first job.
2.2 An Endowment Economy with age milestones
In this section we describe and solve a multi-generations OLG model where age
milestones binding relevant economic periods of households, can exogenously change.
We also derive some algebraic tools that simplify the model solution in closed-form
expressions, and with which the derivatives of the steady state equilibrium real
interest rate with respect to age milestones can be algebraically explicitly derived.
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Consider an overlapping generations model in the spirit of Eggertsson and Mehrotra
[21] where new generations start every year. Imagine that households live L ≡ dL
years (where dL stands for duration of life), but are considered economically active
in the model only after childhood, from the age of adulthood bl (bl standing for
lower borrowing age) until the last year of their lives at age dL. The number of
overlapping generations of the model T = dL− bl + 1 is then determined by two age
milestones, bounding the period that starts at the age of adulthood, and ending at
the last year of their lives. We start by considering an endowment economy where
agents have no capital to invest in, but where households can lend to one another.
After childhood, at age bl households borrow from other households to consume.
During the middle-age period ml (ml standing for lower middle age) they receive
an income in the form of endowment yi=aget which they use to consume, to pay-back
their debts, and to save for retirement by lending to other households. In order to
smooth their life-time consumption path, during the first part of their middle age
period households are borrowers, becoming savers thereafter until the end of their
lives. The initial saving age sl ∈ [ml, ol[ is an endogenous parameter of the model.
Households are retired from age ol to dL, having no endowment and consuming with
the proceeds from their savings during that period.
The model age structure is illustrated in Figure 2.2. Age milestones in red are the
boundaries of life economic periods with durations in green. We can look to an
household from an income perspective, starting his journey as a young borrower
without income who needs to borrow from other agents to be able to consume. The
young borrower’s period has a duration in years of db = ml − bl. He then enters
into middle age, with a duration in years of dm = ol −ml, after finding his first job
at age ml, and gets an income in the form of endowment until retirement at age ol.
Thereafter he will be retired for do = T − dm− db = L−mh years. Alternatively we
can look to an household from a borrowing/saving perspective, which may facilitate
the economic intuition: in the beginning of their journey they are net borrowers
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Figure 2.2: Relevant Life-cycle Periods and Age Milestones
during db years until they pay back their loans, and become savers at the age sl
for ds = dL − sl + 1 years. It is the relative weight of borrowers and savers, or
the interaction between loan demand and supply, that will determine loan market
equilibrium interest rate level. Note that the initial saving age sl, which determines
the relative weight of borrowers and savers, is an endogenous parameter of the
model. sl itself depends on the relative duration of young borrowers, middle age and
retirement periods, with durations respectively given by b, m, and o respectively. In
what follows we will use durations notation b, m and model life span T = b+m+ o
to express most of our findings, where b = ml − bl = bh − bl + 1, m = mh −ml + 1,
and o is retirement duration, here a dependent variable.












Where the U(c) is assumed to be a constant elasticity of inter-temporal substitution
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t+i is the consumption of households
with age bl + i at time t + i. Furthermore agents borrow and lend to one-another
using one year risk-free bonds at an interest rate rt. We can then write the annual
















t+i − (1 + rt+i−1)bb
l+i−1
t+i−1 for age b





t+T−1 − (1 + rt+T−2)bd
L−1
t+T−2 for age = d
L (2.4)
The three budget constraints are similar and can be analyzed from two perspectives.
Considering equation (2.3), an agent with age bl+i at time t+i takes his endowment
yb
l+i
t+i together with a new loan b
i+1
t+i > 0 to consume c
bl+i
t+i and pay his loan and interest
corresponding to the previous period (1+rt+i−1)b
bl+i−1
t+i−1 . Alternatively an agent takes
his endowment yb
l+i
t+i together with his savings −(1+rt+i−1)bb
l+i−1
t+i−1 from previous year
to consume cb
l+i
t+i and to save b
bl+i
t+i for the next year. In this case b
bl+i
t+i is negative.
At the age of adulthood (2.2) there are no loans to pay back from previous year.
During the last year of their lives, (2.4), households do not need to save for the
future any longer. Let:
yit > 0 for i ∈ [ml,mh]∀t (2.5)
yit = 0 for i ∈ [bl,ml[∪]mh, dL]∀t (2.6)
Although endowments are assumed to be strictly positive for the middle age and zero
otherwise - equations(2.5) and (2.6) - we do not need to impose any special restriction
on the duration of the middle age period in order to have distinct borrowing and
savings periods. In particular the duration of middle age period m = dm could
coincide with model’s time span T . It is the endowment and real interest rate paths
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that will determine the annual path of agent loans bb
l+i
t+i that can be positive or
negative in order to smooth households’ consumption path, and consequently of




































t is the value of excess borrowing at time t normalized to the size of the















growth at time t. When excess borrowing is equal to zero then the loan market
is in equilibrium. An equilibrium real interest rate solution path ensures that loan
market is in equilibrium at any time t. If we can find a closed form expression
(at least for steady state equilibria) for excess borrowing as a function of the real
interest rate r and other exogenous parameters of the model x , then we could use
loan market equilibrium equation Bb
l
t (r, x) = 0 and the implicit function theorem
to find closed form expressions for changes of the equilibrium real interest rate with
respect to changes of any parameter of the model x, in particular age milestones:
Bb
l
(r, x) = 0⇒ rx ≡
∂r
∂x












Excess borrowing at time t can be expressed3 as a function of aggregate endowment















Although aggregate endowment at time t, Y b
l
t , is determined by the endowment path,
population growth and time productivity paths, we need a closed form expression for
aggregate consumption which can be obtained by solving the previous optimization
3see appendix A.
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problem (2.1), with a re-casted overlapping multi-generations model in present value
terms using the next proposition4:
Proposition 1 The optimization problem given by equation(2.1), subject to (2.2),(2.3),
and (2.4) is equivalent to maximize the same utility function with respect to consump-
tion, subject to the equality of the present values of consumption Ct and endowments











s.t. Ct = Yt
The solution expressions for consumption at every age are given by5:
Etcb
l+i+1







f(βrt , T )
(2.11)
Expressions for the present value of consumption Ct, and aggregate steady state














= β, γr =
βr(1+r)
(1+g)(1+z)












Proof: The Euler equations of both problems are equivalent. The model is fully
derived in appendix A. .
4from now on, and by default, when the subscripts and superscript are omitted in aggregates
then we are referring to expressions normalized to the size of generation bl at time t: Y ≡ Y blt .
5The model is deterministic.
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Now that the model is solved for consumption, and that we derived a simple closed
form expression for aggregate consumption in steady state, and by assuming ag-
gregate endowment Y can also be represented by a closed form expression (as the
endowment path is an exogenous set of parameters), then based on expression(2.9)
we present in the next proposition a steady state closed form expression for excess
borrowing, the corner stone to explicit the derivatives of equilibrium real interest
rate with respect to age milestones:
Proposition 2 (i) Excess borrowing in steady state is a continuous and differen-
tiable function of the equilibrium real interest rate r ∈]− 1,+∞[, and can be repre-




r−rgz (Y − C) for r 6= rgz
−(1 + rgz)∂C∂r for r = rgz
(2.12)
where 1 + rgz = (1 + g)(1 + z), and x represents the exogenous parameters of the
model.
(ii) B(r, x) = 0 has at least one solution if the no endowment retirement period




T−1 , , and the duration of the initial no-endowment borrowing
period≡ b is strictly lower than T − 1. Moreover, ∂B
∂r
(r) < 0 at least for one solution
r solving B(r, x) = 0.
(iii) If B(r, x) = 0, the derivative of the real interest rate r with respect to any
parameter of the model x can be expressed by:
∂r
∂x
≡ rx = −
Bx
Br
= −Yx − Cx
Yr − Cr
= − logx Y − logxC
logr Y − logr C
(2.13)
Proof: (in appendix B) .
We have now the tools we need to algebraically formalize and interpret the ex-
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pressions for the derivatives of steady state real interest rates with respect to age
milestones at loan market equilibrium. This will be the purpose of the next sec-
tion, for which we still need to formally express an endowment path, and respective
aggregate and present value endowment expressions.
Note that for a constant endowment path for the total duration of the model, with no
population, or productivity growth, and an elasticity of inter-temporal substitution
equal to unity, then 1 + r = 1
β
solves B(r, x) = 0. This solution is equivalent to
the equilibrium real interest rate in steady state of an infinitely lived single agent
model, and assumes a uniform distribution of endowment through the duration of
the model, with no retirement and no ”no endowment” borrowing period b for the
young households. From this starting point the introduction of a retirement period
would correspond to a change of the income path that would reduce the steady state
equilibrium real interest rate through an expansion of excess savings (equivalent to
a contraction of excess borrowing). Moreover, the introduction of a no endowment
period in the beginning of an agent’s economic life would increase r, through an
expansion of excess borrowing. Then changing the duration of relevant economic
periods, through age-milestones changes, may affect households’ income paths, and
consequently excess borrowing through households’ adjusted borrowing and saving
needs in order to smooth households’ life-time consumption paths. The resulting
contraction or expansion of excess borrowing affects loan market equilibrium real
interest rate.
Loan demand and supply
An equivalent way to understand the dynamics of excess borrowing in steady state
is to split its expression Bb
l
t into loan demand L
d
t and supply L
s
t . Loan demand for
a given interest rate r is defined as excess borrowing of all households until the age
they start to be savers, sl. And loan supply is the negative expression of excess
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i) , where ds(r) = [sl, dL[ (2.15)
Note that sl ≡ sl(r, vi) is an endogenous variable of the model, which depends on
r and age milestones vi. Excess borrowing expressed in terms of loan demand and












and loan market equilibrium can now be expressed by:
Bb
l





Where loan demand and supply may be expressed in terms of aggregate income and







b,bl − Cdb,bl) (2.18)
Ls,b
l
= −1 + rgz
r − rgz
(Y d
s,bl − Cds,bl) (2.19)
This equivalent representation of excess borrowing can be helpful when interpreting
how changes in age milestones affect equilibrium real interest rates, by comparing
graphically steady state changes of loan demand and supply, as in Eggertsson and
Mehrotra [21].
In the next section we analytically express and interpret how age milestone changes
affect steady state equilibrium real interest rates.
6expressions derived in appendix
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2.3 Real interest rate derivatives with respect to
age parameters
In this section we present and interpret the derivatives of real interest rate with
respect to age milestones rvi ≡ ∂r∂vi . As age milestones are exogenous parameters
of our model, closed form expressions for the derivatives of real interest rate with
respect to age milestones are given directly using the tools described above, once we
characterize households’ endowment path with continuous and differentiable closed
form expressions for present value of endowment Y, and aggregate endowment Y .
We can interpret rvi ≡ ∂r∂vi as by how much r would have to change to compensate
for the impact in excess borrowing of a change of a given age milestone vi, so that
loan market remains in equilibrium. By reasonably assuming that excess borrowing
is a decreasing function of the real interest rate 7, or Br ≡ ∂B∂r < 0, then an increase
dr > 0 of the real interest rate would have a contraction impact on excess borrowing
B, by ∂B
∂r
dr < 0. In order for loan market to remain in equilibrium B would have to
increase back to 0, through a change ∂vi of any given age milestone vi, which should
have an expansion effect on excess borrowing ∂B
∂vi







dr = 0 (2.20)
Note that the expansion effect ∂B
∂vi
dvi > 0 implies that the change of age milestone
∂vi has the same sign of the derivative of excess borrowing with respect to the age
milestone, which means that if excess borrowing is a negative function of a given
age milestone, then a decrease of this age milestone is required to compensate for
an increase of the real interest rate, which is the same to say that rvi and Bvi have
the same sign, when Br < 0. This is directly observed from the general expression
7From the proof of proposition 2 there are always more solutions for B(r) = 0 where Br < 0
than otherwise. Although Br < 0 for a wide calibration range, we could not find (yet) a sufficient
condition for a unique solution where Br < 0.
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We also inspect how this relation is affected by other relevant parameters of the
model like changes in time related productivity zt, age related productivity ρ
i
t, and
elasticity of inter-temporal substitution 1
σ
. With the same denominator Br we expect
that the derivatives of the real interest rate with respect to the exogenous param-
eters of the model keep a similar proportional relation. While Bv sets the sign of
the real interest rate derivatives with respect to an age milestones, and the relative
magnitude of the derivative with respect to others, Br is the same denominator of
those expressions setting a common amplitude factor. For example, for lower elas-
ticities of inter-temporal substitution 1
σ
, aggregate consumption, and consequently
excess borrowing, are expected to change less with real interest rate changes (Br is
flatter). Then, a stronger real interest rate reaction is required to compensate for
the impact on excess borrowing of changing an age milestone, relative to a higher
EIS. This phenomena can be observed in the calibration section.
Bvi is the term that determines the relative signs and magnitudes of the derivatives
with respect to each other, besides determining the sign of the derivative itself (given
the sign of their common denominator Br). Inspecting Bvi is the purpose of the next
proposition.
The missing pieces to derive a tractable closed-form expression for steady state excess
borrowing are the closed-form expressions for present value and aggregate endow-
ment. With a sufficiently generic endowment path, with no-endowment periods at
the beginning and at the end of the model time span, with durations respectively
given by b ≡ db ≥ 0 and o ≡ do ≥ 0, time and age type productivity growth rates




t = (1 + ρ)y
i
t, the endowment present value and
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Proposition 3 for r > −1 solving B(r, v) = 0, the partial derivatives of excess
borrowing and equilibrium real interest rate with respect to age milestones and du-















(i) The derivatives of the natural rate of interest with respect to age milestones can
be expressed in terms of the derivatives of the natural rate of interest with respect to
the durations of the young borrowing period b, the duration of middle age m, and the
duration of the model T (here the duration of retirement o is a dependent variable):
- Adulthood: rbl = −rb − rT
- First job: rml = rb − rm
- Retirement: rol = rm
- Life expectancy: rL = rT
(ii) for a sufficiently generic households’ endowment path expressed by yit > 0 for i ∈
[ml,mh], and yit = 0 for i ∈ [bl,ml[∪]mh, dL], where time and age related productivity
growth rates, for i ∈ [ml,mh], respectively given by 1 + zit =
yit+1
yit




the partial derivatives Bvi and rvi have the following signs:
 Partial derivatives with respect to durations:
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- Young borrower Bb > 0
Br<0⇒ rb > 0
- Middle age Bm > 0
Br<0⇒ rm > 0
- Model duration BT < 0
Br<0⇒ rT < 0
 Partial derivatives with respect to age milestones:
- Adulthood: Bbl < 0
Br<0⇒ rbl < 0
- First job: Bml > 0
Br<0⇒ rml > 0
- Retirement: Bol > 0
Br<0⇒ rol > 0
- Life expectancy: BdL < 0
Br<0⇒ rdL < 0
Proof: in appendix C.
As the relative signs of the partial derivatives of real interest rate are determined
by the partial derivatives of excess borrowing with respect to age milestones and
durations, given by (2.24), we next present those expressions for interpretation.
The partial derivatives of excess borrowing w.r.t. periods duration d are given by:













BT = −Y βr4HT (γr, βr) < 0 (2.28)
and the partial derivatives of Excess Borrowing w.r.t. age milestones:
Bbl = −Y βr4H−T (γr, βr) = −Bb −BT < 0 (2.29)
























= Bm > 0 (2.32)
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where 4f(x, y) = f(x)−f(y)
x−y > 0 if f
′ > 0; Ha(x) ≡ 1
a
log x−a−log1
x−a−1 , and H
a′ > 08.
All age-milestones expressions have a similar look. (i) The superscript parameter of
function H is the duration the period affected by the change of the age milestone.
The sign of the superscript corresponds to the change sign of the period durtation
with an increase of the age milestone. For example, if bl increases then the duration
of the model T will decrease, and the superscript −T is used for the function H. (ii)











2.3.1 Durations of relevant lifetime economic periods
Model duration T : An increase of model duration T expands the expected retirement
duration for the same amount, o = T − m − b ⇒ ∂o = ∂T , assuming retirement
duration o is the dependent variable. This increases households savings needs dur-
ing middle age for the same steady state real interest rate level, corresponding to
a reduction of excess borrowing. Consequently the partial derivative of excess bor-
rowing with respect to T is negative. For the loan market to remain in equilibrium
a positive compensation of excess borrowing is required by an adjustment of the real
interest rate, which must be negative if the partial derivative of excess borrowing
with respect to the natural rate of interest is negative too, our base case by assump-
tion. A positive change in life expectancy L, calling for a negative change in r leads




Endowment duration m: An increase of endowment duration m contracts the ex-
pected retirement duration for the same amount, o = T −m− b⇒ ∂o = −∂m. This
reduces households savings needs during middle age, corresponding to an increase
of excess borrowing. The mechanism is the opposite as the one described above for
T .
8see proof of proposition 3.
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Initial no-endowment duration b: An increase of b has a double positive effect on
excess borrowing. The first by expanding initial borrowing period by ∂b with a
positive effect on excess borrowing, and a second by contracting the retirement
period by ∂o = −∂b which reduces household saving needs with a further positive
impact on excess borrowing.
The partial derivatives of real interest rates and excess borrowing share the same
sign, if Br < 0, and are analytically expressed by:
rb =




















2.3.2 Age milestones bounding the duration of the model
Age milestones bl and bL ≡ L limit the model duration dT ≡ T = L− bl + 1.
Age milestone L: When only life expectancy 9 increases among all age milestones,
then the model duration T increases by the same amount, T = L−bl+1⇒ ∂T = ∂L,
increasing the expected retirement duration too10, o ≡ do = L − mh + 1 ⇒ ∂o =
∂L = ∂T , impacting negatively excess borrowing by the same mechanism described
above for the model duration T .
Age milestone bl: Furthermore, increasing the age of adulthood bl shortens the
model duration T by the same amount, as well as the duration of borrowing period
db = ml − bl. This contraction of the initial borrowing period leads to a reduction
of excess borrowing for the same real interest rate level.
Bbl = −Bb − BT : Note that an increase of adulthood age can be interpreted as a
9although we use the term expectancy the model is deterministic
10We are inspecting partial derivatives, which means that only one parameter changes.
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combination of changes in two periods: a contraction of the young borrowing period
b, combined with a contraction of the total duration of the model T when the
retirement duration is a dependent variable. As we have seen above, a contraction
of b alone as a double negative effect on excess borrowing. The first one is through
a reduction of loans demand for the same interest rate level, and a second one is
an increase of loans supply through an expansion of the retirement period, in order
to keep the durations of middle age and model period, m and T , unchanged.The
second effect, the retirement duration increase, is directly offset by the reduction of
T which only impacts retirement duration. The combined effect is a contraction of
the borrowing period b, leaving m and o unchanged. So rbl would be equal to −rb if
the dependent duration parameter was T .
The partial derivatives of excess borrowing with respect to age milestones bound-
ing the duration of the model T are both negative. The consequence is the same,
although triggered by different mechanisms: (i) Increasing life expectancy that ex-
pands loan supply, and (ii )increasing the age of adulthood that contracts loan
demand. The partial derivatives of real interest rates have the same negative sign,









2.3.3 Age milestones bounding labor income duration
Age milestones ml and oL ≡ L limit the endowment duration dm ≡ m = ol −ml.
Age milestone ol: An increase of the retirement age ol contracts expected retirement
duration, reducing households’ saving needs, equivalent to increasing excess borrow-
ing for the same real interest rate level. The mechanism is the same as a reduction
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of life expectancy described above.
Age milestone ml: Furthermore, increasing the age of first job ml expands the
duration of the borrowing period db = ml − bl, which causes an increase of excess
borrowing for the same real interest rate level.
Blm = Bb−Bm: Note that an increase of the age of first job can be interpreted as a
combination of changes in two periods: an expansion of the young borrowing period
b, combined with a contraction of the middle age duration m, when the retirement
duration is a dependent variable. As we have seen above, an expansion of b alone
as a double positive effect on excess borrowing. The first one is via an increase of
loans demand for the same interest rate level, and a second one is via a reduction of
loans supply through an contraction of the retirement period, in order to keep the
durations of middle age and the model, m and T , unchanged. The second effect,
the reduction of the retirement duration, is directly canceled by the reduction of
the middle age period m which increases back the retirement duration by the same
amount. The combined effect corresponds to an expansion of the borrowing period
b that leaving retirement duration o unchanged. rml would be equal to rb if T was
the dependent variable.
The partial derivatives of excess borrowing with respect to age milestones bounding
endowment duration are both positive. Same consequence triggered by different
mechanisms: Increasing retirement age that contracts loan supply, and increasing
age of first job that expands loan demand. The partial derivatives of real interest



























Equation (2.25) can also be used to formalize algebraically the partial derivatives of
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the natural rate of interest with respect to other exogenous parameters of the model,
namely the population growth rate g, total factor productivity growth z, and age
dependent endowment growth rate ρ, whose relative signs are given by expression
(2.24).
2.4 Intergeneration transfers
Until now we assumed that agents only interact with each-other by borrowing and
lending. We now introduce transfers between generations in the form of bequests
to children, gifts to parents, and a pay-as-you-go social security system, as those
concepts are closely related to agents age structure. We will see how endogenous
bequest and gifts are affected by changes in age structure, and how a social security
tax may mitigate or amplify those changes.
2.4.1 Intergenerational Altruism
Imagine there are intergenerational altruistic linkages between parents and children,
taking the form of transfers between agents during the last year of their lives and
their direct descendants. We start by assuming that transfers are positive corre-
sponding to positive bequests left by parents to their children, but we also analyze
the case of children caring about their parents wealth. We start by recasting the
budget constraints and derive a re-casted expression for excess borrowing as a func-
tion of the excess borrowing expression without intergenerational transfers, which
will be valid for the two alternative preference functions used later in the sub-section.
Then we endogenize the bequest motive by adjusting agents’ preferences, to inspect
how bequests and gifts are affected by changes of age milestones, and vice-versa. We
use two modeling methods: first a Warm glow bequest motive type, where parents
value the bequest itself. This bequest motive is the one we use to calibrate the model
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in the last section. And second, an altruism bequest motive type, where parents
value their children’s utility.
(i) Recasting budget constraints with bequests
Let inter-generational altruism be represented by the bequest level QTt left or re-
ceived by an agent to or from his direct descendants during the last year of his live
T at time t. A positive Q refers to forward altruism from parents to children, where
Qf ≡ Q > 0. And a negative Q refers to backward altruism from children to parents,
where Qb ≡ −Q > 0. Without loss of generality, and in order to keep the model
tractable the same mechanism is used in both cases. Let Qt ≡ QTt , µ be the age
difference between parents and children, and n the number of children per agent.
Note that n = (1 + g)µ. The budget constraints have adjusted expressions when













t+T−1 − (1 + rt+T−2)bT−1t+T−2 −Qt+T−1 (2.41)
Adjusted present value budget constraint and excess borrowing expressions in steady















4xµ(1 + r, 1 + rgz) (2.44)




Because Mq is positive , Gq is also positive, from where it is straightforward to derive
the impact of bequests on the natural rate of interest from a no-bequest initial state:
Let rq solve Bq(rq) = 0 with an operative bequest motive, and Let r solve B(r) = 0
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otherwise, with an inoperative bequest motive. Note that B(rq) has the same sign
of Q because Bq(rq) = 0 ⇔ B(rq) = QGq(rq) and Gq(rq) > 0. Because we are
assuming that B(r) is a negative function of r we have:
Q > 0⇒ B(rq) > 0⇒ rq < r (2.46)
Q < 0⇒ B(rq) < 0⇒ rq > r (2.47)
From where bequest from parents to children reduce the equilibrium real interest
rate from a no-bequest motive, and gifts from children to parents would have an
opposite effect. By endogenizing the bequest motive we can derive Q, as well as all
adjusted expressions of previous section.
(ii) Warm glow bequest motive:
To derive an expression for bequest Q using a warm glow motive, the previous utility













From FOC Qt+T−1 and ct+T−1 we get a steady state expression for bequests as a









By combining the previous equation with the present value budget constraint (2.42)












Those new tools would be enough to derive new closed-form expressions for the
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partial derivatives of the real interest rates with respect to age milestones. We
approach quantitatively that topic in the last section of this chapter.
We next inspect an alternative bequest motive where agents consider the utility of
their descendants in their preference function. In that case, equilibrium real interest
rates are constant while the bequest motive is active. We deriving the impact of
changing age milestones on the bequest level similarly to previous sections:
∂Q
∂vi







Qvi would have the sign of B
q
vi, since G
q > 0. And if Bqvi and Bvi have the same
sign then the results for Qv would be the same as the ones for rv. For example, an
increase of life expectancy would reduce bequests left to children, and an increase
of the retirement age would have the opposite effect. Let’s then briefly study the
model:
(iii) Altruism bequest motive:
We now assume that bequests reflect agent’s concern for the welfare of their de-
scendants, by weighting children utility in agent’s utility function, in the spirit of
Barro [4]. By using the same mechanism we also examine agents concern with their
parents, following the approach of Blanchard and Fischer [7]. The utility function
takes the expression given below for both cases, where the utility of descendants is
discounted in agent’s utility with a lag of µ years (age difference between parents
and children). The discount factor is β weighted by φf a selfish parameter (Barro
and Sala-i Martin [5]) greater than one when parents prefer an additional unit of
self consumption to a unit of children consumption in the same year. We assume
that the utility of descendants in agents’ preference function is not affected by the
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The budgets constraints of this maximization problem are the same considered at
the beginning of the current section, given by expressions (2.40)(2.41). With no
restrictions on the sign and level of the intergenerational transfer from an agent to
his descendants during the last year of his life, the equilibrium real interest rate






(1 + rgz) (2.54)
The bequest parameter Qf is directly derived from loan market equilibrium expres-
sion given by equation (2.43):
Bq(rφ
f




We have seen that Gq > 0. Then a positive forward bequest Qf implies that
B(rφ
f
) > 0, and consequently rφ
f
< r, where r is the natural rate of interest
of the maximization problem without bequest, since we are assuming that excess
borrowing without bequest B(r) is decreasing with r and B(r) = 0. Then, if rφ
f
< r,
the natural rate of interest with forward altruism rf , and Qf are given by:
rφ
f
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Otherwise, if B(rφ
f
) ≤ 0 ⇒ rφf ≥ r, then there is no loan market equilibrium
with a positive bequest. Consequently Qf = 0, and the excess borrowing expression
with a forward altruism bequest motive Bq is the same as in the problem with an
inoperative bequest motive, and the same for the natural rate of interest:
rφ
f ≥ r ⇒ rf = r, and Qf = 0 (2.57)
To summarize, parents leave bequests to their children only if their natural rate of
interest without the possibility of bequests is greater than rφ
f
. Otherwise they will
leave no bequests to future generations independently of their degree of altruism.






(rf ) ≥ 0 (2.59)
Note that the derivatives of bequest and excess borrowing with an inoperative be-
quest motive with respect to age milestones bounding the endowment period, Qv
and Bv, have the same sign
11. Then the changes in age milestones that affect the
natural rate of interest without bequest will affect bequest levels in the same direc-
tion, when the motive is active. For example increasing retirement age will motivate
parents to increase the bequest to their children. In the next section we confirm
that the same result is robust also for age milestones bounding the duration of the
model, L and bl. Then an increase of life expectancy would reduce bequests left to
children.
Backward Altruism: Agents concerned with their parents’ wealth
We now assume instead that agents are concerned with their parents wealth, by
helping them during the last year of their parents’ lives. The budget constraints are
the same but Q is now negative. The backward transfer parameter from children to
11Gq is constant with respect to ml and ol.
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parents is given by Qb = −Q, and the backwards altruistic parameter by φb. The

















The resulting expressions for the natural rate of interest and transfers from agents
to their parents are a mirror of the above:
rb = max(r, rφ
b
) (2.62)
Qb = − B
Gq







(1 + rgz) (2.64)
Agents help their parents only if their natural rate of interest with an inoperative
bequests motive is lower than rφ
b
. Furthermore, and because the derivatives of Qb
and excess borrowing without bequest B(r) with respect to age milestones have
opposite signs, the changes in age milestones that affect the natural rate of interest
with an inoperative bequest motive will affect bequest levels in the opposite direction
too. For example increasing retirement age will motivate agents to be less generous
with their parents, and a longer life will have the opposite effect.
Two Sided Altruism: Agents concerned with children and parents wealth
We now combine the motivations above by assuming that agents have the choice of
helping their children or their parents. This assumption simplifies the maximization
problem as the same budget constraints can be used, where Q can be positive or
negative, but not both at the same time. We further assume that agents will prior-
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itize supporting their parents at the end of their lives, to future bequests for their
children:
φb ≤ φf ⇔ rφb ≤ rφf (2.65)
Combining the previous results for one sided forward and backward altruism we find





for r < rφ
b ⇒ Qb > 0, Qf = 0
r for r ∈ [rφb ; rφf ] ⇒ Qb = 0, Qf = 0
rφ
f
for r > rφ
f ⇒ Qb = 0, Qf > 0
(2.66)
When the natural rate of interest with an inoperative bequest motive changes signif-
icantly agents may change their altruistic behavior between their children and their
parents. For example, a significant increase in life expectancy could change the mo-
tivation of agents from leaving a bequest to their children to helping their parents.
Or, the increase of retirement age could have the opposite effect: parents would
need less help, and more wealth would be available to help children. Furthermore,
factors that contribute to lower the natural rate of interest without intergenerational
altruism, like the increase of life expectancy, will decrease the propensity to leave
a bequest to the next generation, and increase the willingness to help the previous
one. Moreover in this model the natural rate of interest with and inoperative be-
quest motive increases with productivity. Assuming wealthier societies and agents
are more productive, then the poorer would be more inclined to help their parents,
and the richer their children.
We next introduce in our model a social security tax , to analyze how the equilibrium
real interest rate, as well as bequests and gifts, are affected in the presence of social
security transfers.
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2.4.2 Social Security
We now introduce a pay-as-you-go social security system, where agents pay a tax τ
on their income/endowment while they are working, and receive a pension after re-
tirement equal to total collected social security contributions divided by the number
of retired agents in each year. The budget constraints are now given by:
i ∈ [ml,mh] :cit+i−1 = (1− τ)yit+i−1 + bit+i−1 − (1 + ri−1)bi−1t+i−2 (2.67)













t (1− τMτ ) (2.70)





































Using expression (2.70) in (2.11), we derive excess borrowing with social security
based on (2.12), as the sum of the corresponding expression without social security
with a positive term:
Bτ (r, v, τ) = B(r, v) + τGτ (r, v) (2.73)
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where Gτ (r, v) is positive 12:











The introduction of a social security system of this type corresponds to a forced
redistribution of wealth from workers to the old. The need to save for retirement
is expected to decrease. This fact is reflected by the positive term τGτ (r, x) that
expands excess borrowing, causing the steady state natural rate of interest rτn to be
greater than the one with no social security, rn:
Bτ (rτn, v, τ) = 0⇔ B(rτn, v) = −τGτ (r, v) < 0⇒ rn < rτn (2.75)
or directly from (2.73), the derivative of excess borrowing Bτ with respect to τ is
positive:
Bτ (r, v, τ) =
∂Bτ
∂τ
(r, v, τ) = Gτ (r, v) > 0 (2.76)
The derivative of the natural rate of interest with respect to the social security tax
given is positive13 and is expressed by:
rτ (r
τ
n, v, τ) ≡
dr
dτ
(rτn, v) = −
Gτ (rτn, v)






Social Security and inter-generations Altruism
We now inspect how intergenerational altruism is affected by a social security tax, an
exogenous compulsory transfer from younger to older generations. If agents care for
their parents wealth without any social security system in place it is expectable that
12Note that Mτrz−g > 0⇔
h3(1+rz)−h3(1+g)





13We continue to assume that excess borrowing in the presence o this social security system has
a negative slope with respect to the real interest rate.
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any social security income would reduce the perceived level of help parents would
need when old. Furthermore, if a social security system is sufficiently generous it is
also expectable that elder agents become more motivated to help their children.
Let’s first look to how a pay-as-you-go social security may affect backward altruism
from agents to parents. The optimization problem is now given by agent’s maximiz-
ing inter-generations altruism utility expression (2.52) subject to the budget con-
straints resulting from the direct combination of expressions (2.2),(2.3),(2.40),(2.41),
with (2.67),(2.68),(2.69). The new excess borrowing expression that takes into ac-




, v, Qb, τ) = B(rφ
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, v) = 0 (2.78)
and consequently, Qb = −B(r










Where Qb is positive by assumption. Consequently,





τ < τ b = − B(r
φb ,v)
Gτ (rφb ,v)
⇒ B(rφb , v) < 0⇒ rn < rφ
b
(2.80)
Children will care for their parents wealth when the social security tax is lower than
the threshold τ b. In that case the natural rate of interest is equal to rφ
b
, and the










A higher social security tax discourages transfers from children to parents, until
a point when it starts encouraging bequests from parents to children. This is the
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mechanism we analyze next.
If agents care for their children wealth without any social security system in place it
is expectable that any social security income further increases the propensity to help
the next generation. The optimization problem is the same as before, and forward
altruistic transfers from children to parents require that:
Bτ,f (rφ
f
, v, Qf , τ) = B(rφ
f
, v) + τGτ (rφ
f















Qf > 0⇔ Bτ (rφf , v, τ) > 0⇔
 r
φf < rτn





⇐ B(rφf , x) > 0⇐ rφf < rn
(2.84)
Parents will care for their children wealth when the social security tax is above a
threshold τ f . In that case bequest Qf from agents to their children will change with









An increase of the social security tax encourages forward altruism, which is also an
intuitive result.
2.5 Quantitative calibration
In the previous sections we formalized algebraically the relation of changes of equi-
librium real interest rates and evolving age milestones. Now we explain how those
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milestone changes may account for around one third of the real interest rates reduc-
tion in US in recent years, by calibrating our model with capital during the period
between 1985 and 2005.
We start by formally deriving the model with capital. Then we parametrized it to
match some initial conditions in the initial steady state, namely the real interest
rate, the capital output ratio K
Y
, and the bequests to output ratio, using explicit
values for age milestones in 1985. We use this calibrated version to calculate the
derivatives of the real interest rate with respect to each age milestone ∂r
∂vi
, and check
how those values vary with changes of other parameters and variables of the model.
Finally we estimate how much of the real interest rate reduction between 1985 and
2005 is explained by the age milestone changes observed during the period between
1985 and 2005 using our model.
2.5.1 OLG model with endogenous output and capital
Formally the model with endogenous output and capital is derived in a similar way14.
Although the derivatives of the real interest rate with respect to age milestones can
be easily derived, we do not give in this section their algebraic representation.
The household maximization problem, without bequests an social security for now,
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where the same utility function is used, U(c) = C
σ−1
1−σ . Assets at = kt − bt are
composed by capital kt that households rent to firms, and loans to other households
−bt. The capital portion of assets is always positive but the loans to other households
−bt can be positive or negative. In any case, agents are called borrowers when at < 0
and savers otherwise. While employed each household is given an exogenous annual
labor endowment that is assumed to increase with work experience at a constant





t (1 + ρ)
i (2.90)
Without loss of generality we assume that the labor endowment in the beginning of
the working period lm
l
= 1. Regarding households’ asset composition at = kt − bt,









(1− δ)kbl+i−1t+i−1 + (1 + rkt+i−1)kb
l+i−1













where from the first order conditions of kt and bt, the No-Arbitrage Condition (NAC)
is given by:
rkt = rt + δ (2.92)
Similarly to the previous sections, solving the previous household optimization prob-
lem for consumption, without the bequests and social security modules, is equivalent
15We use this assumption to ensure algebraic tractability.
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s.t. Cblt = Wb
l
t (2.94)
where Wblt is the present value of wages instead of endowments. By introducing




t (1 +MQ − τMτ ) (2.95)
where MQ and Mτ are the same as derived in the previous section, with expressions
respectively given by equations (2.44) and (2.72). The loan market equilibrium
condition is still given by excess borrowing Bb
l





















t for r = rgz
(2.96)





differential function for r ∈]− δ,+∞[, from where the derivatives of the equilibrium










The model with capital with and without bequests and social security, is fully derived
in appendix.
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Table 2.1: Initial steady state parameters for 1985
Description Parameter Value
Emancipation bl 21.0
First job ml 23.0
Retirement ol 65.8
Life expectancy dL 74.6
Discount rate β 0.978
Population growth g 0.9%
TFP growth rate z 0.0%




Labor share α 0.6
Depreciation rate δ 0.1
Bequest parameter (warm glow) φ −0.6
Age children born µ 25
Social security tax τ 12.4%
Initial real interest rate r 4.4%
Estate size/Output Q/Y 2.2%
Capital to output ratio K/Y 2.78
2.5.2 Quantifying derivatives of r with respect to age mile-
stones
We start by parameterizing the initial steady state of the model with capital and
bequests, as in table(3.3) for US in 1985. We use values for average life expectancy





is approximately17 3. We use the bequest parameter φ to match the ratio
Q
Y
around18 0.02. We do not consider a social security tax in the base case scenario
of the model. We derive the value of β by solving Bb
l
t (r = 4.4%, vi) = 0, where 4.4%
is the real interest rate corresponding to the initial steady state in 1985.
We then use the above parameters to calculate the derivatives of the real interest rate
with respect to each age milestone using the expressions derived in previous sections,
16We assume that the ages of adulthood and first job are respectively equal to 21 and 23. We
could alternatively have assumed, with similar results, that the age of adulthood was 18 instead,
and that those two initial age milestones coincide, which might change the calibration of β.
17Brinca et al. [8].
18Hendricks [28]
69
CHAPTER 2. AGE MILESTONES AND LOW INTEREST RATES
Table 2.2: Derivatives with same parametrization, β = 0.978: changing r
Derivatives of r with respect to age
Scenario bl ml ol L r
E≡ Endowment economy −0.85% 0.70% 0.64% −0.48% −0.93%
E+Q≡ Bequests −0.89% 0.68% 0.68% −0.48% −1.62%
E+Q+τ ≡ Social security tax −0.64% 0.58% 0.38% −0.29% 2.34%
K −0.62% 0.72% 0.30% −0.35% 4.83%
Base case: K+Q −0.62% 0.69% 0.31% −0.33% 4.40%
K+Q+τ −0.59% 0.69% 0.26% −0.31% 6.42%
in several scenarios starting with an endowment economy and successively adding
bequests, capital, and social security19. In table(2.2) we use the same parameters of
our base case scenario, with endogenous output, capital, and a bequest motive, to
calculate the derivatives of real interest rates with respect to age milestones, with and
without capital, bequest and social security. Since all parameters besides φ, α, and
τ are unchanged for all scenarios, the natural rates of interest r changes accordingly:
r is higher when capital is introduced, lower when bequest are operative, and higher
when social security is considered. Furthermore, we observe the following:
• The model can generate negative steady state equilibrium real interest rates,
as can be observed in the Endowment Economy scenario of table(2.2).
• The signs of derivatives of real interest rates with respect to age milestones,
rvi , are the ones expected: increasing life expectancy, and increasing age of
adulthood have a negative impact on the real interest rate, respectively be-
cause savings expand, and borrowing contracts. Increasing the retirement age,
as well as the age of first job, both impact positively the real interest rate, re-
spectively because savings contract, and borrowing expands.
• When the capital weight in the model increases, an increase of the real interest
rate ∂r has a greater expansion impact on loan supply, S = −B, to compen-
19Derivatives are calculated using each corresponding expressions for endowment economy sce-
narios, and compared with numerical estimations for all scenarios.
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Table 2.3: Derivatives setting r = 4.40%, adjusting β for equilibrium
Derivatives of r with respect to age
Scenario bl ml ol L β
E≡ Endowment economy −1.06% 0.99% 0.44% −0.32% 0.944
E+Q≡ Bequests −1.10% 1.00% 0.44% −0.30% 0.942
E+Q+τ ≡ Social security tax −0.75% 0.73% 0.35% −0.27% 0.962
K −0.58% 0.68% 0.31% −0.36% 0.981
Base case: K+Q −0.62% 0.69% 0.31% −0.33% 0.978
K+Q+τ −0.45% 0.54% 0.26% −0.31% 0.996
sate for the contraction of capital, requiring bigger changes in age milestones
to sustain loan market in equilibrium. This reduces, in absolute terms, the
derivatives of real interest rates with respect to age milestones, when capital
is introduced in the model.
In table(2.3) we calibrate all the scenarios to match the steady state natural rate
of interest of the base case, by adjusting β. We observe that the derivatives cor-
responding to higher age milestones (retirement age, and life expectancy) become
more similar across scenarios, and that in general the orders of magnitude do not
change significantly.
We continue to test the robustness of the model in table (2.4), where we can also
observe that the derivatives of the real interest rates with respect to age milestones,
are generally less sensible to changes of the main parameters of the model, with the
exception of the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution 1
σ
.
As we can observe in table(2.5), the constant relative risk aversion coefficient σ is
a determinant factor driving the magnitude of the derivatives. Excess borrowing is
more rigid for higher levels of σ, calling for a lower change of an age milestone in
absolute terms, to compensate the same real interest rate change, in order to keep
loan market in equilibrium. Consequently the derivative corresponding to a greater
σ will be greater. In table(2.5) we observe a relation of quasi proportionality between
real interest rate derivatives and σ: The elasticity of intertemporal substitution then
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Table 2.4: Robustness Analysis
parameter≡ x ∂x y = rvi(x+ δx)/rvi(x)
ybl yml yol yL
1
σ
0.5→ 1.0 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5
g 0.9%→ 0.0% 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.1
z 0.0%→ 1.0% 1.3 1.3 1.0 1.0
ρ 0.0%→ 1.0% 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1
δ 0.1→ 0.2 1.2 1.1 1.4 1.2
α 0.6%→ 0.7% 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.0
φ −0.6→ 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
τ 0.0%→ 12.4% 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.9
Table 2.5: Relative Risk Aversion
Derivatives of r with respect to age
σ bl ml ol L
0.5 −0.14% 0.15% 0.07% −0.07%
1 −0.30% 0.31% 0.14% −0.15%
2 −0.62% 0.69% 0.31% −0.33%
3 −0.96% 1.19% 0.50% −0.54%
4 −1.32% 1.91% 0.74% −0.79%
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Table 2.6: Simulation Results
Scenario Age milestones natural rate of interest: r
bl ml ol L σ = 1 σ∗ = 2 σ = 3 σ = 4
Base case: 1985 21.0 23.0 65.8 74.6 4.4% 4.4% 4.4% 4.4%
2005 21.0 23.0 64.6 77.5 3.7% 2.5% 1.2% −0.3%
2015 23.0 25.0 64.6 79.0 3.5% 2.2% 0.9% −0.6%
4(1985, 2005) 0.0 0.0 −1.2 +2.9 −0.7% −1.9% −3.2% −4.7%
4(1985, 2015) +2.0 +2.0 −1.2 +4.4 −0.9% −2.2% −3.5% −5.0%
σ∗ = 2 is the base case scenario.
seems a decisive factor when age structure is considered, as it can greatly influence
the conclusions and quantitative results from a calibrated model. This becomes clear
in table (2.6) where, in our base case scenario with σ = 2, changes in age milestones
could explain around half of the real interest rate decline from 1985 to 2005/2015
in US, considering a real interest rate equal to 4.4% in 1985 and around zero in
201520. We use observed values for average retirement age and life expectancy, as
well population annual growth rate 21. But if we calibrate the model using σ = 1,
the same age milestone changes would account for around one fourth of the total
real interest rate decline during the period in study. And if σ takes the value of 4
then the demographic changes during the same period would be able to explain the
full real interest rate decline.
We can conclude with the observation that the constant relative risk aversion coef-
ficient may work as an amplification factor of the impact of demographic changes
on the natural rate of interest.
20We assume that young agents postpone by two years their adulthood, first job, and first child
in 2015, relativity to 2005.
21The reduction of population annual growth rate from 0.9% in 1985 to 0.7% in 2005 explains a
reduction of the real interest rate of around −0.2%.
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2.6 Final remarks
In this chapter we formalized the relation between real interest rates and relevant
age milestones of a person’s life, using an overlapping multi-generations model where
one generation correspond to one year.
Although the impact of age structure in relevant World economies has been a recur-
rent topic covered in recent literature, in particular to explain the persistent decline
of interest rates and economic stagnation, there has not yet been an attempt, to the
best of our knowledge, to formally derive the analytic relations between real interest
rates and each age milestone. The purpose of this chapter is to fill out this gap,
by deriving tractable algebraic real interest rate elasticity expressions with respect
to each age parameter, in order to formalize the mechanisms by which real interest
rate changes occur. This allows, for example, to algebraically derive precisely by
how much the natural rate of interest may be permanently dragged down eventually
to negative levels, by any combination of increasing life expectancy, postponing first
child birth, lowering the retirement age, increasing adulthood age, or reducing the
age of first job. Moreover, we can use our framework to quantify the contribution
of population age structure changes, to the decline of real interest rates in recent
years, which can be close to one half according to a calibrated version of our age
milestones toolbox.
The main underlying mechanism relating age milestones and real interest rates in
our model relies on the relative place and duration of labor income with respect
to life expectancy when agents smooth consumption. For example, a longer re-
tirement period, resulting from a reduction of the retirement age or an increase of
life expectancy, makes households save more, thus expanding the supply of loans
which drags down the real interest rate that ensures equilibrium in the loan market.
We also inspect how the exogenous parameters of the model, namely the elasticity
of inter-temporal substitution, productivity growth, income growth path of house-
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holds, and population growth, may amplify or mitigate the impact of age milestones
changes on the natural rate of interest. In addition we inspected how inter-generation
transfers are affected by age milestone changes. For example, why and how increas-
ing life expectancy may reduce endogenous bequest levels, decrease the propensity
to help children, or increase the willingness to help parents.
Laterally to our main contribution in this chapter, the analytic formulation of in-
terest rate changes with respect to age milestones, we also developed a tractable
algebraic framework to solve overlapping multi-generations optimization problems
with a demographic structure.
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2.A Proposition 1: Present Value and Aggregate
Consumption
By expressing bT−1t+T−2 in the third budget constraint (2.4) in terms of endowment
and consumption, and recursively substituting the expressions for bit+i we can derive
the following equality between present values of expected households’ consumption






where Cl,ht is the present value of expected future and present consumption of an
agent with age l at time t, until age h at time t+(l−h) - and the same for endowment
- given by expressions:





, where (1 + r)it =
i−1∏
j=0
(1 + rt+j) (2.A.2)
We omit the present value upper bound when it is equal to dL, or Xl,ht ≡ Xlt.
Equation (2.A.1) is intuitive, and corresponds to a present value budget constraint
derived from the previous ones, (2.2) to (2.4). It means that the present value of
lifetime consumption of an household is equal to the present value of its endowment
path. The borrowing/saving path of an household, or its loan path, is an enabler of
its optimal consumption path, given its income path.
A more general version of the present value budget constraint, at any given age, is
given by the following expression:
Cbl+it = Yb
l+i
t − (1 + rt−1)bb
l+i−1
t−1 (2.A.3)
This expression is also self-explanatory: The forward present value of consumption
at time t is equal to the present value of the endowment path minus debt and
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interest costs from previous period (or plus savings and interest income from previous
period). Equations (2.A.1) and (2.A.3) will be frequently used, in particular to
derive expressions for equilibrium consumption, for which we previously derive from
consumption First Order Conditions the consumption general Euler equation for

















By using the Euler equation (3.A.13) in the present value general expression given
by (2.A.2), we get an expression for the present value of consumption dependent on











t f(βrt , T − i) (2.A.6)









1−x . This simplifies the algebra in the special case of a log utility function for σ = 1
and βr = β, as well as when formulating expressions for steady state. Combining
the previous equation (2.A.6) at the age of adulthood with the present value budget
constraint given by (2.A.1), we can express consumption at the age of adulthood in





f(βrt , T )
(2.A.7)
A useful expression when deriving aggregate consumption in steady state, later on.
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Then a general expression for endowment present value at time t and its correspond-






























For now we solve the model with a generic endowment path. Later on we will use a
more specific expression for it, in order to find explicit expressions for the derivatives
of the real interest rate w.r.t. age milestones.
We express household consumption at age bl+i in a similar way, by using expressions
(2.A.3) and (2.A.6). It depends on the present value of income from age bl + i until
the end of life, on expected real interest rate path, but now takes into account the




Ybl+it − (1 + rt−1)bb
l+i−1
t−1
f(βrt , T − i)
(2.A.11)
The borrowing level of an agent with age bl + i at time t, bb
l+i
t can be determined re-
cursively using budget constraints (2.2) and (2.3), and using consumption expression
(2.A.11). A simplified expression using determined past and present consumption








where Cl,h−t is the present value of past and present consumption of an agent with
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Equation (2.A.12) means that the borrowing level of an agent with age bl+ i at time
t is equal to the present values of past and present consumption and endowment
levels since the beginning of his economic life, ate age bl. The term (1 + rt−1)b
bl+i−1
t−1
is then determined by past endowment and consumption paths of an household.
Those tools will be useful to derive the transition dynamics of the model, namely
when age milestones are changed.
To summarize, we derived expressions for consumption and borrowing levels of
households with any age bl + i at time t. Consumption cb
l+i
t is expressed in terms
of future income, expected future real interest rate path, and loans from previous
year. And borrowing level at age bl + i and time t, bb
l+i
t , is expressed in terms of
present and past consumption, income and interest rate levels. cit and b
i
t are then
completely determined given an expected real interest rate path that solves loan
market equilibrium, or excess borrowing equal to zero at any time t.
Assuming that the size of each generation at time t with age bl + i is N it we define














. Equilibrium in the bond market is
given by:
∀t : Bblt = 0 (2.A.14)
where Bb
l
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Excess borrowing Bb
l
t can be expressed in terms of aggregate endowment and con-
sumption at time t, and excess borrowing at t− 1, by replacing the second budget
























































⇔ 1 + r = (1 + g)(1 + z) = 1 + rgz (2.A.19)
⇒ Y(rgz) = Y (2.A.20)
Moreover, aggregate consumption in period t normalized to the size of the youngest





















Note that in steady state, cb
l+i







t−i [βr(1 + r)]
i (2.A.23)
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and that cb
l



















⇒ cbl+it = cb
l








































. Note that if r = rgz the γr = βr. We have seen that
Y(rgz) = Y , then in steady state:
C(rgz) = Y (2.A.28)
This is an important point in proof of the continuity of excess borrowing in propo-
sition 2.
We define an equilibrium as a set of processes {cit, bit, rt} ∀i ∈ [bl, dL] that solve
(2.1) subject to (2.2),(2.3),(2.4),(3.A.13), and (2.A.14), given an exogenous process
for {blt,mlt, olt, dLt , gt, zt, ρit}, ∀t. Inspired by Auerbach and Kotlikoff [3], the effect of
changing age milestones at time t on existing cohorts is the same as if they were born
again, behaving like members of a new generation but with a shorter life expectancy,
and initial assets resulting from prior accumulation.
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2.B Proposition 2: Excess Borrowing Steady State
Properties
(i) The steady state expression for excess borrowing normalized to the size of the
younger generation in the model, with age bl, is derived directly from (2.A.16):
Bb
l











for r = rgz
, where 1+rgz = (1+g)(1+z) (2.B.1)
The lower line of the expression ensures that Bb
l
(r, x) is continuously differentiable
for r ∈]− 1,+∞[, in particular for r = rgz.
Proof (i): in steady state rt = r and so on for gt and zt:
Bt =Ct − Yt − (1 + rt−1)Bt−1 = Ct − Yt − (1 + rt−1)
Bt




1− 1 + r
(1 + g)(1 + z)
]
= C − Y (2.B.3)
⇔B = 1 + rgz
r − rgz
(Y − C) (2.B.4)
Continuity and differentiability of excess borrowing when r = rgz
Aggregate endowment is a constant function of r, and aggregate consumption is
continuous and differentiable for r ∈] − 1,+∞[. Then we just have to prove the
continuity and differentiability of steady state excess borrowing for r = rgz. For







[Y − C(r)] (2.B.5)









Then B(rgz) = −(1 + rgz)∂C∂r (rgz) ensures the continuity of excess borrowing for
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r ∈]−1,+∞[ in particular for r = rgz. Likewise, B′(rgz) = −(1+rgz)C ′′(rgz) ensures
the differentiability of excess borrowingfor r ∈]1,+∞[ in particular for r = rgz.
(ii) Existence and properties of a solution B=0: B(r, x) = 0 has at least one solution
if the no endowment retirement period duration≡ o is lower than the elasticity of
inter-temporal substitution times the model duration, or 1
σ
> o
T−1 , and the duration of
the initial no-endowment borrowing period≡ b is strictly lower than T−1. Moreover,
∂B
∂r
(r) < 0, at least for one solution r solving B(r) = 0.
Proof: We prove that if this condition is verified then excess borrowing tends to
+∞ when r tends to −1+, and to −∞ when r tends to +∞. Then, because of the
continuity and differentiability of excess borrowing there exists at least one solution
r such that B(r) = 0, where B′(r) ≥ 0:
With endowment levels equal to zero at the beginning and end of life, aggregate and



























where b is the duration of the initial no-endowment period, m the duration of the
period while yi > 0, and ml the age where the endowment period begins.
(i) B(r = −1+) > 0? Because the term 1+rgz
r−rgz < 0 if r = −1
+, and Y is constant





then βr=−1+ = β
1
σ (1 + (−1+)) 1σ−1 = 0+ ⇒ f(β−1+ , T ) = 1 ⇒ C(−1+) = +∞ →
B(−1+) = +∞. If 1
σ
< 2 then f(β−1+ , T ) = +∞. f(βr, T ) = βT−1r f(β−1r , T ).



















σ (1 + r)T−b−m−
T−1









(ii) B(r = +∞) < 0? Because the term 1+rgz
r−rgz > 0 if r = +∞, and Y is constant
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in terms of r, then it is sufficient that C(+∞) = Y(+∞) f(γ+∞,T )
f(β+∞+,T )
= +∞. If 1
σ
< 2
then f(β+∞) = 0 ⇒ f(β+∞, T ) = 1 ⇒ C(+∞) → (1+r)
T−1
(1+r)b
= +∞ if T − 1 > b, a
plausible assumption. If 1
σ
> 2 then f(β+∞, T ) = +∞. f(βr, T ) = βT−1r f(β−1r , T ).
f(β−1+∞, T ) = 1 ⇒ f(β+∞, T ) → βT−1+∞ ⇒ C(+∞) → yb
l







if T − 1 > b
If the ratio of the retirement period to the total duration of the model is lower than
the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution 1
σ
, and T > b − 1, then there exists a
steady state equilibrium solution for r, where B(r) = 0, and excess borrowing is a
decreasing function of r around that solution.
(iii) The derivative of the real interest rate r with respect to any parameter of the




≡ rx = −
Bx
Br
= −Yx − Cx
Yr − Cr
= − logx Y − logxC
logr Y − logr C
(2.B.10)
Proof: We use the partial derivatives of steady state excess borrowing with respect
to r and to any parameter x, from the steady state version of expression (2.A.16),
to formulate the derivative of the natural rate of interest with respect to parameter
x (in particular an age milestone vi), assuming equilibrium in the loan market in
steady state, or Bb
l
(r, x) = 0:
B(r, x) = 0⇒ rx =
dr
dx









To inspect how the equilibrium real interest rate changes with respect to change
of any exogenous parameter of the model x, we derive closed form expressions for
dr
dxi
(r, xi, x−i), where r solves B
bl(r, x) = 0 given x ≡ (xi, x−i) ∈ Rn, where n is
the number os exogenous parameters of the model, and xi ∈ V ≡ all exogenous
parameters of the model, in particular the age milestones with the exception of sl.
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We use the fact that excess borrowing must remain equal to zero after a change in
xi. In order words, we need to derive by how much the equilibrium real interest
rate must change in order to compensate for the impact of a change in xi on excess
































































Y (logx Y − logxC)
(2.B.15)











⇔ Yx = Y logx Y (2.B.16)
And from where we can directly derive a simplified expression for the partial deriva-
















logx Y − logxC
logr C
(2.B.18)
22Because in this model aggregate endowment is independent of the real interest rate, LogrY = 0
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2.C Proposition 3: Real Interest Rate Derivatives
w.r.t age parameters
For a sufficiently generic households’ endowment path expressed by:
yit > 0 for i ∈ [ml,mh] (2.C.1)
yit = 0 for i ∈ [bl,ml[∪]mh, dL] (2.C.2)
where time and age related productivity growth rates, for i ∈ [ml,mh], respectively
given by 1 + zit =
yit+1
yit
, and 1 + ρit =
yi+1t
yit
, steady state expressions for aggregate




































where periods duration are defined by b = ml−bl, m = ol−ml, where ol = ml+1. In
addition, the partial derivative of excess borrowing with respect to the real interest
rate Br(r, v) ≡ Br is the denominator common to the derivatives of the real interest
rate with respect to all exogenous parameters of the model, where LogrC can be
expressed by:
LogrC = LogrY + Logrf(γ, T )− Logrf(βr, T ) (2.C.6)
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= 0 for σ = 1 (2.C.9)
where 1 + rzρ =
1+r
(1+z)(1+ρ)
. Now that we have closed-form expression for aggregate
consumption and endowment, we start by expressing the derivatives of excess bor-
rowing with respect to the durations d of the main periods of the model, b = ml−bl,
m = ol−ml and T = L−bl+1, (the retirement period is here a dependent variable),
for algebraic simplification, and because we can express the partial derivatives of B
and r w.r.t. age milestones as a linear combination of durations due to the above
linear relation between those two sets of parameters:





BL = BT (2.C.13)
Same relations valid for rvi .
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Deriving logd Y , where d ∈ {b,m, T}:



















then logb Y = −log(1 + g) (2.C.16)













and logT Y = 0 (2.C.18)
where H(x,m) = h(x
−m)
m
, and h(y) = log y
y−1 =
log y−log 1
y−1 > 0, naturally
23. Note that
Hx ≡ ∂H∂x > 0. Proof Hx > 0:




(y−1)2 < 0⇔ 1−
1
y
− log y = g(y) < 0.
g′(y) = 1−y
y2
⇒ g′(y) > 0 if y < 1, g′(y) < 0 if y > 1, and g′(1) = 0. So g(y),and



















+ logd f (γr, T )− logd f (βr, T )
(2.C.20)








and logT C = H(γr, T )−H(βr, T ) (2.C.23)
Let 4f(x, y) = f(x)−f(y)
x−y ,and note that f
′ > 0 ⇒ 4f > 0, directly from the Mean
23h(y) > 0 by applying the Mean Value Theorem
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Value Theorem. For notation purposes let Hm(x) ≡ H(x,m), Hmx ≡ Hx(x,m), and
4Hm(x, y) = H
m(x)−Hm(y)
x−y > 0∀m ∈ Z, since H
m
x > 0. The derivatives of excess




(logb Y − logbC) = Y (1 + rgz)4 log(1 + r, 1 + rgz) (2.C.24)













BT = −Y βr4HT (γr, βr) < 0 (2.C.27)
(2.C.28)
Derivatives of Excess Borrowing w.r.t. age milestones:
Bbl = −Bb −Bt = Y βr
[
4HT (γr, βr)−4 log(γr, βr)
]
(2.C.29)
= −Y βr4H−T (γr, βr) < 0 (2.C.30)












Bol = Bm > 0 (2.C.32)
BL = BT < 0 (2.C.33)
Derivatives r with respect to durations:
rb =













(log(γr)− log(βr)) > 0
(2.C.34)
rm =
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Derivatives of r with respect to age milestones, and their sign, assuming that Br < 0:












































2.D OLG model with endogenous output and cap-
ital:
Household problem
The same household objective function, and the budget constraints where wages








































t+T−1 + (1 + rt+T−2)a
oh−1
t+T−2 (2.D.4)
where utility of consumption U(c) = C
σ−1
1−σ , and elasticity of inter-temporal substi-
tution EIS = 1
σ
. Assets at = kt − bt are composed by capital kt that households
rent to firms, and loans to other households −bt. The capital portion of assets is
always positive but the loans to other households −bt can be positive or negative.
In any case, agents are called borrowers when at < 0 and savers otherwise. While
employed each household is given an exogenous annual labor endowment that is as-
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sumed to increase with work experience at a stable rate24. The expression for labor





t (1 + ρ)
i (2.D.5)
Without loss of generality we assume that the labor endowment in the beginning of
the working period lm
l
= 1.
Regarding households’ asset composition at = kt − bt, we can rewrite the budget









(1− δ)kbl+i−1t+i−1 + rkt+i−1kb
l+i−1













From the first order conditions of kt and bt the No-Arbitrage Condition (NAC) is
given by:
rkt = rt + δ (2.D.7)
Equilibrium expressions for consumption and asset supply are derived as in section
2. From households’ budget constraints with capital we derive a present value
household budget constraint, now given by:
Cbl+it = Wb
l+i
t + (1 + rt−1)a
bl+i−1
t−1 (2.D.8)








which means that the present value of consumption from age i until life expectancy
Le is equal to the present value of labor income during the same period plus the
assets and respective interests from the previous age i−1. In the model with capital
24We use this assumption to ensure algebra tractability.
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endowment yit is replaced by labor income wtl
i
t. From the same Euler equation
(2.D.10) we find also the same expression for consumption of an household at time









⇒ Cbl+it = cb
l+i
t f(βrt , T − i) (2.D.11)




k=1 βrt+k−1 . The equilibrium expressions for house-
hold consumption and assets have the same expressions as in section 2 where lending
to other households −bit that can be positive or negative is replaced by assets ait.





f(βrt , T − i)
[









t + (1 + rt−1)a
bl+i−1
t−1 (2.D.13)















Firms are perfectly competitive and take prices are given. They hire labor and rent
capital to maximize profits. Their profit maximization problem is given by:
max
yt,kt
yt − wtlt − rkt kt (2.D.16)




t ,where Zt = (1 + z)Zt−1 (2.D.17)
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By replacing the previous demand expressions in the production function we derive




























Equilibrium in the asset market
Same loan market equilibrium condition:





















































An equilibrium is defined in the same way as in section 2, as a set of processes
{cit, ait, rt} that solve (2.D.2),(2.D.3),(2.D.4),(2.D.10), and (2.D.22) ∀i, given an ex-
ogenous process for {gt, blt,mlt, olt, Lt}.
Relevant expressions in steady state
Previous expressions for steady state equilibrium are algebraically more tractable.
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t for r = rgz
(2.D.26)
Where 1 + rgz = (1 + g)(1 + zα), and 1 + zα = (1 + z)
1
α . Aggregate steady state
expressions of consumption , labor income and capital, normalized to the population































































Deriving aggregate consumption with capital
Aggregate consumption with capital is derived in the same way as in section 3, only
replacing the present value of the endowment path Yblt by the present value of labor











Note that in steady state the consumption of and agent of age i at time t is given




























































where γ = βr(1+r)
(1+g)(1+zα)
. And where Wblt is the steady state expression for the present

































Continuity of excess borrowing when r = rgz
If r = rgz then βr = γ, and 1+rz = 1+g. Consequently, and directly from expressions
(2.D.27) and (2.D.28), if r = rgz then C


























is independent of the real interest rate r. Aggregate
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The steady state natural rate of interest rn solves B(rn) = 0. The properties of B(r)
and the derivatives of the natural rate of interest with respect to age milestones are
derived using the same methodology as in section 3.
The third point of proposition 3 has the following adjusted version:
(ii) Existence and properties of a solution B=0: B(r, x) = 0 has at least one solution,
if the duration of the initial no-endowment borrowing period≡ b is strictly lower than
T − 1. Moreover, ∂B
∂r
(r) < 0, at least for one solution r solving B(r) = 0.
Proof: We prove that excess borrowing tends to +∞ when r tends to −δ+, and
to −∞ when r tends to +∞ if b < T − 1. Then, because of the continuity and
differentiability of excess borrowing there exists at least one solution r such that
B(r) = 0, where B′(r) ≥ 0:
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Inequality and Real Interest Rates
Abstract
We explore the relation between income inequality and real interest rates based on the
marginal borrowing and saving rates of an heterogeneous population with respect to life-
time income. We use an overlapping generations New Keynesian model with borrowing
constraints and a bequest motive, to show how an increase of income inequality may
trigger a permanent reduction of the real interest rate, (i) via a contraction of aggregate
borrowing, when the marginal borrowing rate of the wealthier is lower than the one of
the poorer with respect to income. (ii) We then show how an increase of inequality may
trigger an expansion of savings through the channel of a bequest motive where generosity
towards the next generation increases endogenously with lifetime income, so that the
marginal savings rate of the wealthier is higher than the poorer.
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3.1 Introduction
Income inequality has been increasing since the early 80’s in relevant world economies
(Piketty [33]). For example, in US the income share of the 1% wealthier increased
from around 10% in 1980 to more than 20% in 2014 (Figure:3.1). During the same
period the real interest rates have been decreasing to levels close to zero. In this
Figure 3.1: US income shares with capital gains 1913-2014: Top 0.1% and 1%
Source: Piketty [33]; The World Wealth and Income Database - WID
chapter we formally relate those two phenomena based on evidence from recent lit-
erature that the wealthier save marginally more and borrow marginally less than
the poor, so that the net impact of an increase of income inequality would be an
expansion of aggregate savings, together with a contraction of aggregate borrowing,
thus dragging down the real interest rate.
On the savings side, Dynan et al. [19] besides empirically validating the fact that
the rich save more (Figure:3.2), also found evidence that the marginal savings rate
98
CHAPTER 3. INEQUALITY AND REAL INTEREST RATES
(MSR) is higher for high income households: In income quintiles 1 and 2 they esti-
mate that MSR increases $0.030 for each dollar of income increase, against $0.429
for income quintiles 4 and 5. They also state that higher savings rates for higher-
income groups are consistent with an operative bequest motive. Although, on another
angle, bequests have also been considered in recent literature as a relevant source
of income inequality (Galor [24], and Piketty [33]), in our work inequality is not en-
dogenized, but it is the channel through which an endogenous bequest motive may
become operative when parents expect their children to be less wealthy than them-
selves. So that when income inequality increases, high income type agents become
even richer than the average, which further increases their endogenous generosity
towards their children, whose expected wealth remains equal to population income
mean, by increasing the level of bequests. The savings mechanism in our model re-
lating inequality to real interest rates can then be summarized in the following way.
Inequality turns on a bequest motive for the rich, and turns it off for the poor. The
marginal savings rate with an operative bequest motive for the rich is greater than
with an inoperative bequest motive for the poor, such that an increase of income
inequality triggers an expansion of aggregate savings of the richer that prevails over
the contraction of aggregate savings of the poor, resulting in a net expansion of total
aggregate savings, that drags down the equilibrium real interest rate.
On the borrowing side, in a recent paper Mian and Sufi [32] found strong hetero-
geneity among marginal propensities to borrow (MPB) of households, by examining
the impact of rising U.S. house prices on borrowing and spending from 2002 to 2006.
They found evidence that the rich have a lower marginal propensity to borrow than
the poor : Specifically, on average MPB increases by $0.19 per dollar of home value
increase, but by $0.26 for the poorer households, and close to $0 for the wealthier.
Similarly, in a recent NBER working paper, Agarwal et al. [1] found empirical evi-
dence that the marginal propensity to borrow is lower for higher credit scores, but
in contrast with higher marginal propensity to lend (MPL) of the banks for higher
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credit scores. Taking this into account, in a credit constrained environment, the
marginal borrowing rate (MBR) should be driven by banks marginal propensity to
lend to the poorer, and by the marginal propensity to borrow of the unconstrained
richer. This is a relevant factor to look at when modeling a borrowing constraint
later in the chapter.
Figure 3.2: Saving Rates and Income
Source: Dynan et al. [19], PSID
In this chapter we propose a formal framework to inspect the relation of increas-
ing income inequality and persistently low real interest rates, based on decreasing
marginal borrowing and increasing marginal saving rates with respect to income. So
that an increase of income inequality triggers a net contraction of aggregate borrow-
ing, as well as a net expansion of aggregate savings, resulting in a lower equilibrium
real interest rate. We present a model where persistently low real interest rates are
driven by increasing income inequality, by building and combining on some rele-
vant topics in economic literature, namely on Secular Stagnation (Eggertsson and
Mehrotra [21]), on the relation of marginal propensity to save and life-time income
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(Dynan et al. [19]), on the relation of marginal propensity to borrow with income
and wealth (Mian and Sufi [32]) and (Agarwal et al. [1]), on inequality (Galor [24],
and Piketty [33]), and bequests (Barro and Sala-i Martin [5] and Blanchard and
Fischer [7]).
In what follows, in the second section of this chapter we derive a formal general
framework linking changes of real interest rates with increasing income inequality.
We use the loan market equilibrium equation to derive an algebraic relation be-
tween (i) the partial derivative of the real interest rate with respect to the standard
deviation of households’ income distribution, (ii) and the marginal borrowing and
saving rates of the wealthier and the poorer. We then use this relation to describe
the mechanisms by which MBR decreases, and MSR increases with income, which
respectively result in the contraction of aggregate borrowing, and the expansion of
aggregate savings, when the standard deviation of income distribution increases. In
the third section we formalize a more specific overlapping generations model with
three periods based on the work of Eggertsson and Mehrotra [21], to explicitly de-
scribe the concepts presented before with a single agent type per generation, and
observe that the real interest rate may decrease if the next generation is expected
to be poorer.
In section 4, we introduce in the model income inequality among same generation
households. We inspect how borrowing constraints alone can trigger a reduction
of real interest rates when income inequality increases. Then, we use a warm glow
bequest motive to start by showing that the equilibrium real interest rate can be
persistently low, and materially lower than if the bequest motive is not operative.
By adding income inequality into the model, and by assuming that generosity with
respect to children is an exogenous positive function of income, we get an increas-
ing marginal savings rate with income, causing the equilibrium real interest rate to
decrease with an increase of income inequality. The mechanism is straightforward.
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If the rich get richer, then bequests increase more than proportionally to income:
Bequests primarily increase because income increases, but also because households
become more generous. Loan supply of the wealthier expands more than propor-
tionally to the increase of income. The opposite is true for the poor, so that the
net effect of increasing inequality, by causing a savings expansion of the rich which
prevails over a savings contraction of the poor, results in a net aggregate savings
expansion, and a reduction of the real interest rate. This mechanism is then en-
dogenized by replacing bequests in household’s preference function by the expected
present value of children gross life-time income which includes the bequest received
from their parents. We first consider a single agent income type to show that the
marginal propensity to save is lower when parents expect their children to be wealth-
ier than them, and higher otherwise. So that an intergenerational increase of income
inequality, when parents expect children to be relatively poorer, expands aggregate
savings and lowers real interest rates. The same is valid for intra-generational in-
come inequality. Poorer households expect their descendants to be wealthier than
them, so that their bequest motive endogenously becomes inoperative; the opposite
is true for the wealthier. So the poor and the rich have respectively lower and higher
marginal savings rate due to operative and non-operative bequest motives, so that
the net effect of increasing income inequality is a net expansion of loans supply
leading to a reduction of the real interest rate as well. We describe in appendix a
similar result by considering the utility of consumption of children in the parent’s
preference function.
Finally in section 5 we calibrate a model with endogenous output and capital to es-
timate how much of the real interest rates reduction in recent years can be explained
by the observed increase of income inequality in US, by using our model.
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3.2 Inequality, Marginal Borrowing/Saving rates,
Real Interest Rates
Imagine a closed economy, in the spirit of Eggertsson and Mehrotra [21], where
households live for three periods, are borrowers in the first, savers in the second, and
retired in the third. During the first period of their lives they consume by borrowing
from the middle age. During the second period they receive an endowment income
y, and eventually a bequest from their parents, they pay-back their loans to the
retired, and save for retirement by lending to the young. In the third period they
retire and use their savings to consume, and to possibly leave a bequest to their
children. Middle age endowment is distributed according to the density function
f(y, ȳ, σy), where ȳ and σy are respectively the mean and standard deviation of
households’ income. σy is here a measure of inequality, and ȳ is assumed constant.
The real interest rate in this model is given by the equilibrium in the loan market
such that aggregate demand equals aggregate supply of loans at any time t. At
time t young households borrow Byt (rt, yt+1) to consume. Their borrowing level is
a function of the real interest rate and of their expected income during the second
period of their lives yt+1, that we assume is known by lenders. In addition at time
t, middle aged households save −Bmt (rt, yt) to be able to consume when old.
Let loan demand and supply per middle age household at time t be given by the
following general expressions, which depend on the real interest rate and on the
middle age endowment distribution:
Ldt (rt, ȳt+1, σyt+1) =
∫
Byt (rt, yt+1)f(yt+1, ȳt+1, σyt+1)dyt+1 (3.2.1)
Lst(rt, ȳt, σyt) = −
∫
Bmt (rt, yt)f(yt, ȳt, σyt)dyt (3.2.2)
The equilibrium real interest rate rt is a solution to loan market equilibrium such
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that:
Let (rt, ȳt, σyt , ȳt+1, σyt+1) = L
s
t(rt, ȳt, σyt)− Ldt (rt, ȳt+1, σyt+1) = 0. (3.2.3)
where we define Let as excess savings at time t, and from where we derive the following


















If we assume that the denominator of the last expression ∂L
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∂r
is positive 1, then




For which it is sufficient that aggregate savings increases, and aggregate borrowing












We now split household population in two sets of relative constant sizes. A set




and a set containing the high income types with size equal to 1 − η. We assume




is, naturally, an increasing function of σyt .
We can also express loan supply and demand as the weighted average of loan supply



















∂r can be a reasonable assumption.
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where MBRθ ≡ ∂Ld,θ
∂ȳθ
and MSRθ ≡ ∂Ls,θ
∂ȳθ
are respectively the marginal aggregate
borrowing and saving rates with respect to average income of a given population
segment θ.
The impact of increasing income inequality on the real interest rate is given by the
sign of the marginal change of excess savings with respect to the standard deviation
of endowments, which can be expressed in terms of marginal saving and borrowing














Where 4hlMSR = MSRh −MSRl. Then, given that ∂ȳh
∂σy








< 0⇔4hlMSR > 4hlMBR (3.2.9)
A sufficient condition for a decreasing real interest rate with increasing income in-
equality is that MSR increases and MBR decreases with income, as has been evi-
denced in recent economic literature. In particular, Mian and Sufi [32] found recently
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2002 to 2006, that on average the marginal propensity to borrow MPB increases
$0.19 per dollar of home value increase, but $0.26 for the poorer households, and
close to $0 for the richer. Agarwal et al. [1] also found empirical evidence that the
marginal propensity to borrow declines with credit scores, In their recent NBER
working paper. In the savings side, besides empirically validating the fact that the
rich save more, Dynan et al. [19] found evidence that the marginal propensity to
save is higher for high income households: In income quintiles 1 and 2 they estimate
that MPS increases $0.030 for each dollar of income increase, against $0.429 for
income quintiles 4 and 5.
If empirical evidence suggests that marginal propensity to save is a positive function
of income, 4hlMPS > 0, and the marginal propensity to borrow is a negative
function of income, 4hlMPB < 0, and no borrowing or savings constraints were
considered in our economy, then we could assume that MSR = MPS and MBR =
MPB which would immediately imply by equation (3.2.9) that real interest rates
would decrease with an increase of income inequality. We present next a simple
model based on Eggertsson and Mehrotra [21] to inspect those mechanisms.
3.3 Secular Stagnation Endowment Economy Model
with Bequests
We now formalize the framework described in the previous section in a specific
model. We start by assuming that households have the same income type. More
concretely a representative household of a generation born at time t has, for now,
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Where Cyt , C
m
t , and C
o
t are respectively the consumption of young, middle aged,
and old; Qt is a bequest transfered from old households to the next generation when
middle aged, and φ ∈] − 1; +∞[ accounts for the fact that households when old
may discount bequests differently than their consumption. For example if φ → ∞
parents are selfish in the sense they prefer an additional unit of old age consumption















Cot+2 = −(1 + rt+1)Bmt+1 −Qt+2 (3.3.4)
(1 + rt)B
y
t ≤ Dt, where Dt = θY mt+1
µ (3.3.5)
0 ≤ Qt (3.3.6)
Bt is a one period risk-free bond at an interest rate rt. Consumption of the young
is constrained by the amount they can borrow (3.3.2). The budget constraint of
the middle aged is given by equation (3.3.3); they receive and income Y m, pay their
loans with interest (1 + r)By, save for retirement Bm, and receive from previous
generation a bequest Q. Equation (3.3.4) is the budget constraint of old households
3For now we derive the model with a log utility function because it improves the tractability
of algebraic expressions, without loss of generality, as we show in the last section and in appendix
A of this chapter, where we use a reasonable calibrated CRRA preference function and introduce
endogenous output and capital in the model. We assume, as in the first chapter of this dissertation,
that the slope of loan supply, if negative, would never be lower in absolute terms than the slope
of loan demand, meaning that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is assumed to be greater
than a minimum threshold lower than one, and also lower than standard literature EIS levels[27].
A negative loan supply slope would mean that an income effect would prevail over the substitution
effect given an increase of the real interest rate.
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that use their savings with interest (1 + r)Bm to consume, and transfer a positive
bequest Q to the next generation. Inequality (3.3.6) correspond to the assumption
that bequests are positive.
We assume for now that all households are credit constrained (3.3.5), and that the
borrowing limit of the young is binding. Later we relax this assumption. We also
assume that the borrowing limit is a positive function of expected lifetime income
(µ > 0 and θ > 0), and known by the lenders when agents are young.
The equilibrium real interest rate of this model solves loan market equilibrium equa-
tion, requiring that the demand for loans Ldt equals supply L
s
t at any time t, or that
Nyt B
y
t is equal to −Nmt Bmt =, equivalent to:
Ldt = (1 + gt)B
y
t = −Bmt = Lst (3.3.7)
where Nmt = N
y
t−1 and 1 + gt =
Nyt
Nyt−1
is defined as the growth rate of births.
Loan Demand
From equation (3.3.2) and inequality (3.3.5) corresponding to the binding borrowing





Using inequality (3.3.5) and assuming the borrowing limit is binding, loan demand
is given by:






In order to model Dt as a binding borrowing limit for all households we need to
ensure that the constrained demand for loans Ldt is lower than the unconstrained
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1 + β + β2
= Ld,ut ⇔ Dt = θY mt+1
µ ≤
Y mt+1
1 + β + β2
(3.3.10)




we ensure that the limit is binding for all values
of Y ∈]Ymin;Ymax[. Those parameters also ensure that the marginal borrowing rate
MBR is a negative function of income, consistent with what is empirically expected











Later we endogenize the fact that ∂MBR
∂Y
< 0 by questioning the assumption µ ∈]0; 1[
and test an alternative where µ ≥ 1, and the binding borrowing limit assumption
relaxed for the wealthier.
Loan Supply









Using equation (3.3.12) in the budget constraint of the old (3.3.4)4, we get an ex-














By combining this expression for Cmt with the middle aged budget constraint (3.3.3)
we derive an expression for Loan supply with bequests, which is greater or equal
4as well as the deterministic nature of the model.
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than the corresponding expression with an inoperative bequest motive (Q = 0):
Lst = −Bmt =
β
1 + β











Furthermore, the marginal savings rate MSR with an inoperative bequest motive














Note that the concavity of the marginal borrowing rate with respect to income is
here explaining the convexity of the marginal savings rate with respect to income,
which is itself the consequence of an exogenous parametrization of the borrowing
limit given by assuming that µ < 1. We later relax this assumption together with
not requiring a binding borrowing limit for the wealthier households, and get a
similar result. Furthermore we will analyze a mechanism only dependent on the
loan supply side of the model based on bequests.
Bequests
We now inspect how the level of generosity of parents towards children affect the
marginal savings rate and the natural rate of interest. In particular we compare
expressions with and without an operative bequest motive. By combining the First
Order Conditions for Cot+2 and Qt+2 with the middle age budget constraint we derive
the following expression for expected bequest of next period5:
EtQt+1 = (1 + rt)Ψ
(





The constant Ψ = β
β+(1+φ)(1+β)
∈]0; 1[ for φ ∈] − 1; +∞[ can be interpreted as a
generosity coefficient of parents towards children. The bequest to descendants at
time t + 1 is expected to be higher at time t for a higher interest rate at time t.
5The endowment economy model with a warm glow bequest motive is derived in Appendix A.
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Moreover, with this preference function the bequest motive is always strictly positive
and operative unless φ = +∞⇒ Ψ = 0. This becomes evident when loan market is





By replacing the bequest expression (3.3.16) in the loan supply expression (3.3.14),
we derive a general expression for loan supply depending only on bequest received











This is a useful expression in particular when we assume later on that children and
parents income types are iid, so that the average expected bequest received by any
income type is the same. In this single income type framework, we now derive
the marginal savings rate when loan market is in equilibrium, from loan supply













[Y mt −Dt−1] (3.3.19)
As expected, loan supply in equilibrium expands with an operative bequest motive,
which results in a lower natural rate of interest:






Y mt − 1+φ2+φDt−1






6As noted already, loan supply with a log utility function is inelastic with respect to the real
interest rate, meaning that income and substitution effects cancel each-other. This makes algebraic
expressions more tractable, without loss of generality, since for reasonable low EIS values (lower
than one), when income effect prevails over the substitution effect, the negative slope of loan supply
with respect to the real interest rate does not change the impact sign on the real interest rate of
a loan supply expansion.
111
CHAPTER 3. INEQUALITY AND REAL INTEREST RATES
Regarding the marginal savings rate given by expression bellow we can observe that


























(−D′′t−1) > 0 (3.3.22)
But we can also observe that the convexity of MSR with respect to income is a direct
consequence of the concavity of the marginal borrowing rate. Consequently with this
preference function, an increase of income inequality would impact negatively the
natural rate of interest from the savings side, only as long as the marginal borrowing
rate is negative sloped with respect to income. Unless generosity with respect to
the next generation increases when agents become wealthier. We explore those
mechanisms in the next section by introducing income heterogeneity in the model,
and inspect separately the impact of loans demand and supply sides on the natural
rate of interest when inequality increases, respectively by canceling the bequest
motive, and the borrowing limit concavity.
3.4 Decreasing real interest rates, with increasing
income inequality
Inequality is introduced in the model by considering two types of agents with differ-
ent endowments levels when middle-aged. We assume that the average endowment
at time t is always constant, and given by:
Y mt = ηY
m,l









= θµY µ−1t > 0, D
′′
t−1 = θµ(µ− 1)Y
µ−2
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Table 3.1: Summary of model conditions for increasing inequality to decrease r
General condition for ∂r
∂σy
< 0 : 4hlMSR > 4hlMBR
Sufficient conditions for ∂r
∂σy
< 0: 4hlMBR < 0 4hlMSR > 0
Borrowing mechanism X X
- µ < 1, and borrowing limit binding for all agents: X X
- or µ > 1, and borrowing limit binding just for the poor: X X
Savings mechanism X
- φ′(y) < 0: Generosity increases exogenously with income: X
- or bequest ZLB, Q ≥ 0, becomes binding for the poor: X
η is the fraction of low income households. The standard deviation of this income
distribution at time t and its derivative with respect to high type income are respec-
tively given by the following two expressions:
σyt = (Y
m,h

























So the equilibrium real interest rate decreases with increasing income inequality if
4MSRhlt > 4MBRhlt . We now inspect separately the mechanisms respectively
related to the borrowing and supply sides of the model, briefly summarized in
table(3.1).
3.4.1 Borrowing constraints, inequality, and real interest
rates
We cancel the bequest motive in this subsection by setting φ = +∞. From expres-
sions (3.3.11) and (3.3.21) we derive 4MSRhlt and MBRhlt and observe that the
condition is verified, so that the real interest rate in this model decreases with an
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t ) > 0 (3.4.5)








t . It is the concavity of the
borrowing limit that determines the above result, of an increase of income inequality
lowering the equilibrium real interest rate. In fact, if µ = 0 as in Eggertsson and
Mehrotra [21], or µ = 1 so that the borrowing limit is a linear function of expected
income, then 4MBRhlt = 4MSRhlt = 0 and an increase of income inequality would
not impact the real interest from the borrowing side of this economy.
i) Assumption that all agents are credit cosntrained when young
If we assume that all agents are borrowing constrained when young, it is also reason-
able to assume the concavity of the borrowing limit, consistently with their marginal
propensity to borrow, and in contrast with a constant borrowing limit presuming
that lenders have no information whatsoever about borrowers income type, or, in
the other extreme, in contrast with a linear function of expected income that would
presume lenders have full information for a given lending motive.
ii) Assumption that only the low income type are credit constrained
We now recall the work of Agarwal et al. [1] who showed that credit card limits
in US not only increase with credit scores, but so does the marginal propensity to
lend from banks. The borrowing limit in our model would be an increasing convex
function with respect to expected income, with µ > 1, but would only bind for the
low income types. We further assume that for average income Ȳ m constrained and
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unconstrained borrowing levels would be equal:








1 + β + β2
(3.4.7)
Y = Ȳ :Ldt (Ȳ ) = L
d,u
t (Ȳ )⇔ θ = (1 + β + β2)−1 (3.4.8)
Without loss of generality we assume that Ȳ = 1. Then for the borrowing limit to





























θY ht+1 ⇔ (Y ht+1)µ−1 > 1
(3.4.10)











The marginal borrowing rate of the low types is higher than the high types for


























Having inspected the impact of borrowing limits on inequality/real interest rate
8For reference h(1+) = 0.37 and h(4) = 0.63
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dynamics, we now look at the savings side of the model with an operative bequest
motive.
3.4.2 Bequests, inequality, and real interest rates
In their paper ”Do the Rich Save More” Dynan et al. [19] show that higher savings
rates are associated to higher lifetime income. They also find evidence that the
marginal savings rate(MSR) is a positive function of lifetime income. The results of
previous sections are consistent with their findings, in particular due to the fact that
the marginal savings rate of the rich are higher because their marginal borrowing
rate are lower. Dynan et al. [19] inspect several factors explaining an increasing
marginal savings rate with respect to income, that would result in the reduction of
the natural rate of interest when income inequality increases. We next analyze the
conditions under which a bequest motive is one of those factors. In order to do so,
we cancel the concavity of the borrowing limit by setting µ = 0 so that the marginal
borrowing rate MBR = 0 as in Eggertsson and Mehrotra [21]. We also assume that
the borrowing limit is binding for all households. Aggregate loan supply for each










We assume through the rest of the chapter that parents and children income types
are iid so that on average the bequest received from parents is the same among
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Note that average bequest naturally increase with generosity, and decrease with
population growth since more children mean a lower parcel of the same bequest per
child. Then in the present model the marginal savings rate is independent of income




⇒4MSRhlt = 0 (3.4.17)
An increase of inequality expands savings of the high type, and contracts savings of
the low type. Because the marginal savings rate of high and low types are equal, the
two effects cancel each other not affecting aggregate loan supply and equilibrium real
interest rate. This model as is does not capture the fact that the poor may have less
propensity to leave a bequest to their children because they prioritize consumption,
or may expect their children to be better off. A straightforward way to account for
this is to assume that the level of generosity of households with respect to the next
generation increases exogenously with income.
i) Generosity increases exogenously with lifetime income
As seen earlier, the parameter φ is a measure of selfishness. When φ tends to infinity
bequests tend to zero, as well as Ψ. The parameter Ψ can then be interpreted as a
measure of generosity towards the next generation. We now assume that the level
of generosity increases with income Y m,it . Let Ψ
i = Ψ(Y m,it ) = ψY
m,i
t , where ψ is a












being a measure of selfishness, is now a decreasing function of lifetime income. The
supply of loans for a given income type is given by:
Ls,it =
β + ψY m,it
1 + β
(





Now the steady state average bequest expression increases with increasing income
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inequality:
Q = (1 + r)
ψ(Y h















If the rich are more generous towards their descendants then the bequest increase
of the wealthier prevails over the bequest contraction of the poorer when inequal-

















The fact that rich and poor discount bequests differently is sufficient to trigger the
mechanism by which an increase of income inequality has a negative effect on the
equilibrium real interest rate level. Next we endogenize this mechanism by making
an adjustment of the bequest motive in the preference function, such that households
leave bequests because they compare expected wealth of their descendants with
themselves, and are willing to help if they expect children to be poorer, but not if
they expect them to be wealthier.
ii) Generosity increases endogenously with lifetime income
We now assume that agents trade-off consumption by expected gross wealth of
next generation, instead of bequests directly. They care for their children expected
wealth relative to their own, in contrast of just caring for leaving a bequest to the
next generation, independently of whether they need their help or not. By next
generation expected gross wealth we mean the sum of their expected endowment
and the bequest received from their parents. In this case the bequest zero lower
bound given by (3.3.6) may become binding. The utility function of a representative
9Note that ∂Q
∂Y h
> 0 and ∂Q
∂Y l
< 0. Furthermore Ψ = ψY m,Ψh = ψY m,h and Ψl = ψY m,l.
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, and the utility is maximized subject to the same budget
constraints (3.3.2),(3.3.3),(3.3.4) and inequalities (3.3.5) and (3.3.6). We use the
same methodology as in previous sections to derive an expression for the bequest
transfered to the next generation, when bequest zero lower bound is not binding:
Qt+1 = (1 + rt)Ψt (W
m






∈]0; 1[ for φ ∈] − 1; +∞[. The previous expression for
Qt+1 may become negative if descendants endowment present value is expected to






























In this economy, if the present value of children expected endowment is sufficiently
low compared to the net wealth of their parents, and considering their level of
generosity, then the bequest motive becomes operative and savings expand with
respect to an inoperative bequest motive state. The expansion of parents savings
increases further with expectations that children are poorer. Then the marginal
savings rate when the bequest motive is operative is greater higher than when it is
119









This is a relevant expression when intra-generation inequality is introduced in the
model, because wealthier agents tend to expect their children to be relative less
wealthy, and then be more generous, in contrast with poorer households that expect
their children to be better off than them, and then tend to be less generous. But
before that we will still present the following expression for the natural rate of
interest when the bequest motive is operative:










Y mt −Dt−1 + Qt1+gt−1
< 1 + rnt (3.4.26)
Then, when the bequest motive is operative the natural rate of interest decreases
if generosity towards children Ψt increases, or if expected income of descendants
decreases. The natural rate of interest may increase until an upper bound given by its
expression with an inoperative bequest motive, when children expected endowment
increase above a given threshold.
Note that, an expected increase of inter-generation inequality reduces the natural
rate of interest in this model.
If children are expected to become relatively poorer than parents, (or parents be-
come relatively wealthier than children) then the supply of loans expands causing a
reduction of the equilibrium real interest rate.
We now assume that there is intra-generation income inequality in our economy as
in previous sections: ηsY
m,l
t + (1 − ηs)Y
m,h
t = Y
m, and that children and parents
types are iid. We further assume that parents don’t know their children income type
when they make the bequest decision, so that children expected income is equal to
Y m. Then poorer households expect descendants to be richer than themselves, and
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the richer expect their children to be poorer. In this case the condition for a positive










⇔ Y γt +
Qi
1 + gt−1





where γ ∈ {l, h}, and i is household’s id. Note that this condition is the same for
all households, since the right-hand side of the equation(3.4.28) does not depend
on any income type in particular. For the subset above the threshold the marginal
savings rate is equal to β+Ψt
1+β
and higher than the marginal savings rate of the ones
in the subset below β
1+β
. A sufficient condition for an operative bequest motive for
all high income types is given by:
Y ht >




+Dt−1 ⇒ Qh,it+1 > 0 (3.4.29)
If there exists at least one low type household for which the bequest zero lower
bound binds then the aggregate marginal savings rate of low types is lower than
the one of the high types, such that the conditions for the mechanism linking an
increase of income inequality to lower interest rates are satisfied. In the next section
and in appendix we show that under reasonable assumptions low types may have
their bequest motive always inoperative, while always operative for high types. In
that case we can derive a close form expression for the derivative of the natural rate
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3.5 Quantitative calibration of the model
In previous sections we were able to formally capture some of the mechanisms sup-
porting the relation between increasing income inequality and decreasing real inter-
est rates, although with a simple and stylized OLG model. We nevertheless think it
would be of value to try to estimate by how much our model, explicitly parametrized,
could explain the reduction of real interest rates in recent years.
In the period between 1985 and 2005 the real interest rates in US have fallen from
4.4% to −0.2%, while the share of the wealthier population decile increased 10
percentage points, from 38% to 48% (Figure: 3.3)10. How much of the real interest
rate reduction of −4.6% during that period is our model able to explain, is the
question we try to answer next.
Figure 3.3: Real Interest Rates and Income Inequality in US
Source: The World Wealth and Income Database - WID (Piketty); Fred
10Source: The World Wealth and Income Database - WID (Piketty); Fred
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We start by verifying how much of the effective reduction of the real interest rate
during the observation period is explained by a base case calibration of our model
due to an increase of income inequality. We then test the robustness of the real
interest rate reduction to calibration changes of relevant parameters.
The model used for calibration is the warm glow type version where generosity en-
dogenously increases with agents lifetime income. The endogenous bequest motive
is modeled by considering descendants expected wealth in agents preference func-
tion, rather than only the bequest itself. Expected wealth being equal to the sum
of descendants expected lifetime income and bequest received from parents. It is
assumed that labor endowment types of agents and their descendants are indepen-
dent, so that expected income of descendants of the wealthier and poorer is the
same, and equal to expected average income of all households of their generation.
Agents expecting wealthier descendants than themselves have lower incentives to
leave bequests, and would consequently save relatively less than wealthier agents
that expect their descendants to be relatively poorer, and would then save more.
We also introduce capital in the model as in Eggertsson and Mehrotra [21] 11, and
allow for a CRRA utility function where the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution
may be different than one. A steady state equilibrium for this economy is defined
with the requirement that average total bequests received by middle-age household
during one period is equal to the average total bequests left by the old during the
next period.
The calibration of the benchmark model is described in Table 1, with usual annual
parameters calibrated according to recent literature, namely the discount rate β12,
the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution 1
σ
, depreciation rate δ13, and the loan
collateral concavity µ. In the model, the discount rate β and the depreciation rate
11Model with capital, a warm glow type bequest motive, and a CRRA utility function described
in Appendix A
12β is calibrated at 0.571 for a period of 20 years, corresponding to 0.972 for a period of one
year.
13δ is calibrated at 0.88 for a period of 20 years, corresponding to 0.10 for a period of one year.
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Table 3.2: Parameters and Simulation Results
Description Parameter Value
Calibration:




Descendants wealth discount rate φ 1.01
Collateral concavity (D = θY µi ) µ 0.50
Depreciation rate (year) δ 0.1
Population growth g 0.7%
Low income type population share η 90%
Average labor endowment L 1
Low income type labor endowment Ll 0.69
High income type labor endowment Lh 3.80
Matching:
High type population share 1− η 10%









Mean initial estate size/lifetime income Q/Y 3.6%
Debt to income ratio D/Y 0.36
Capital to annual income ratio k/y 3.0
Initial real interest rate rini 4.4%
Results:
Final real interest rate - model rss 3.4%
real interest rate change - model 4modr −1.0%
real interest rate change - observed 485−05obs r −4.6%
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δ are adjusted for a period of 20 years. We match initial and final top decile income
shares by adequately calibrating labor endowments of the wealthier and poorer at
initial and final steady states. We then calibrate the discount factor β combined
with the bequest discount rate (or selfish parameter φ), to match the initial steady
state values of the real interest rate, and average estate level as a proxy of the
bequest level cap (Hendricks [28]), with the observed values in the beginning of the
observation period. The collateral multiplier θ, is calibrated to obtain an initial
reasonable debt limit to income ratio D
Y
, after setting the collateral concavity.
In an OLG model with three periods of 20 years each, the implied labor share
of the Cobb-Douglas production function α20, should be greater than the typical
approximate value of two thirds. By setting α20 = 0.86 >
2
3
, the capital to annual
income ratio in the initial steady state is set to 3.0.
The benchmark model is able to explain around 22% of the effective real interest
rate reduction during the observation period: An increase of the top decile income
share from 38% to 48% would lead to a real interest rate reduction of 1.0%, from
4.4% to 3.4%, in contrast with an observed total reduction of 4.6%, from 4.4% to
−0.2%. Low income agents do not leave bequests to their descendants in the initial
and final steady states, which is consistent with recent literature (Benhabib et al.
[6]). But high income types increase the level of bequests left at the end of their
lives. The marginal increase in savings of high types, due to an increase of income
inequality, prevails over the savings contraction of low types, resulting into a net
expansion of loan supply, and a consequent reduction of the natural rate of interest
(figure 3.4). Loan demand contracts because of the concavity of the borrowing limit.
We test the robustness of our results by changing some parameters one by one to
commonly used values (Table: 2), and by checking the impact on the reduction
level of the natural rate of interest, although ensuring the initial real interest rate
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Figure 3.4: Equilibrium in the Loan Market
Source: The World Wealth and Income Database - WID; FRED
and average estate values match observations in the beginning of the period. The
change magnitude of the natural rate of interest due to an increase of 10 percentage
points of top decile income share is generally robust to other parameter changes, in
particular for significantly different initial bequest to income ratio levels.
Although the increase of income inequality between 1985 and 2005 only seems to
account, according to our model, for around 22% of the reduction of the real interest
rate during that period, it is nevertheless not an insignificant value. There are other
relevant factors that certainly may explain the difference, namely age structure
changes in population, like life expectancy and the retirement age (see chapter 2), or
debt deleveraging, a birth rate slow-down, or a reduction of the price of investment
(Eggertsson and Mehrotra [21]). Combining all those factors in a single multi-
generations model in order to better understand the relative contributions of each
of those factors in a consistent way is part of our work going forward.
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Table 3.3: Robustness analysis
INPUTS OUTPUTS
Description parameter benchmark sensibility 4r




Depreciation (year) δ 0.1 0.2 −1.02%
Population growth g 0.7% 0.0% −1.04%
Collateral multilier θ 0.45 0.35 −1.04%
Collateral concavity µ 0.5 0.0 −0.67%
Bequest/lifetime income Q
Y
3, 6% [1.0%; 10.0%] [−0.91%;−1.13%]
3.6 Final remarks
In this chapter, we formalize the relation between increasing income inequality and
low real interest rates using an overlapping generations model with borrowing con-
straints and a bequest motive. The underlying mechanism in our model relating
real interest rates and inequality is based on empirical evidence in recent literature
that households’ marginal borrowing and saving rates are respectively negative and
positive functions of income, so that the net effect on aggregate borrowing and sav-
ings of a permanent increase of income inequality is respectively a net contraction
and a net expansion, that may lead to a persistent reduction of the natural rate of
interest.
In particular, the borrowing mechanism in our model is based on the concavity of
the marginal propensity to borrow, and on binding borrowing constraints, both con-
sistent with empirical observations in recent literature[1][32]. The saving mechanism
is illustrated with an endogenous propensity of households to be more generous with
respect to their children by leaving them greater bequests, when they are expected
to be relatively poorer. In the opposite direction, if agents expect their direct de-
scendants to be much wealthier than them, then the bequest motive may become
inoperative. So that wealthier households are more generous, which makes their
marginal savings rate higher than the poorer households that leave lower or no be-
127
CHAPTER 3. INEQUALITY AND REAL INTEREST RATES
quests at all, as also observed by Hendricks [28]. In this model the savings channel
through which inequality affects the real interest rate is then the bequest motive,
that is endogenously turned on or off respectively for the rich and the poor, making
the marginal savings rate of the rich greater than the poor, so that an increase of
inequality triggers a net expansion of aggregate savings that drags down the natural
rate of interest.
Our main contribution in this chapter is to present an explicit formalism linking low
real interest rates with increasing income inequality, by gathering and building on
some relevant topics in recent literature, namely increasing income inequality[33],
bequests[4][7], the question of whether higher-lifetime income levels lead to higher
marginal propensity to save[19] and lower marginal propensity to borrow[1][32], and
secular stagnation[21][34].
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3.A Endogenous Output and Capital
Here we derive the model with endogenous output and capital, its equilibrium con-
ditions, as well as operative bequest conditions for each income type. We assume
that only the middle age supply labor and capital to competitive firms that take



















From where Zt = 0, and output supply can be expressed by Yt = wtLt + r
k
tKt. The


































Cot+2(i) = −(1 + rt+1)Bmt+1(i) + (1− δ)Kt+1(i)−Qot+2(i) (3.A.8)
(1 + rt)B
y
t (i) ≤ D
y
t (i), where D
y




Qot+1(j) ≥ 0, where (j) represents household’s (i) parents. (3.A.10)
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where U(Ct) =
C1−σt −1
1−σ , and Y
m
t (i) = wtL
m










Y mt+2(i) is household i children expected income. From the first order conditions os
Wmt+2 and C
o































Using the production function and the first order conditions for Kt+1 we derive the

















In the case of the benchmark model we assume that children and parents labor en-




L̄mt+2. Using the expressions above we can derive the following expression
for bequest if strictly positive, and equal to zero otherwise:
Qot+1(i) = (1+rt)Ψt
[




−(1−Ψt)(1 + gt)Ȳ mt+1 (3.A.17)
14We can use this expression because the model is deterministic.
130
CHAPTER 3. INEQUALITY AND REAL INTEREST RATES







∈]0; 1[ for φ ∈]− 1; +∞[.
We introduce income inequality in the model by assuming that there are two exoge-
nous labor endowment types Lγ for the middle-aged, where γ ∈ {low, high} ≡ {l, h}.
Loan supply per middle age household has then the following expression:
Lst = ηL
s,l























(1 + βrt)(1 + rt)
(3.A.20)

























If all high types leave a bequest to their descendants, and all low types leave none
loan supply aggregation in steady state is straight forward, and the difference of





Although we do not enforce this mechanism we nevertheless present the conditions
its verification. Given the bequest expression (3.A.17) it is possible to derive the
value for the bequest received by one agent in period t when middle age, above
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Received bequests by any household have a maximum value which is the steady
state bequest of a high agent type where all its ascendants where of the high type


















In steady state, if Qm,lmin,t > Q
m
max then the bequest motive of all low income types
is always inoperative, although they may receive some from their parents of high
type. Moreover, if Qm,hmin,t < 0 then all high type agents leave a bequest to their
children independently of having received a bequest from their parents. Those two
conditions are verified for any reasonable calibration of our model.




















Qo,l = 0 (3.A.27)
Q̄o = (1− η)Qo,h (3.A.28)
3.B Intergenerations Utility of Consumption
We now consider the utility of children in the preference function. Utility is maxi-
mized subject to the same budget constraints as in previous sectins, (3.3.2), (3.3.3),















where vt = log(C
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Assuming that the bequest zero lower bound is not binding, from FOC Qt+2 we














Where 1 + rbt = (1 +φ)
1+gt
β
.Then, in steady state, the equilibrium real interest rate
with an operative bequest motive is given by:




From loan market equilibrium we derive a general expression for the equilibrium
real interest rate in steady state, which is strictly lower than rn when the bequest
motive is operative, and Q > 0:












= 1 + rb < 1 + rn (3.B.5)






(rn − rb)(Y m −D) (3.B.6)
Consequently, in steady state, the bequest motive is operative if and only if the
no-bequest natural rate of interest rn = 1+β
β
(1+g)D
(Ym−D) is greater than r
b = (1 + φ)1+g
β
.
Otherwise, when rn ≤ rb ⇒ Q = 0 and r = rn. Then, if the steady state no-bequest
natural rate of interest rn as in Eggertsson and Mehrotra [21] decreases below the
threshold rb the bequest motive of households become inoperative.
Inequality and low interest rates
We now consider two household income types h and l as in previous sections, and
assume that average income is constant, so that Y m = ηsY
m,l
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further assume that parents born at time t − 1 receive no bequests at time t, and
children don’t leave bequests to future generations at time t + 2. From the budget
constraints we derive the following expressions for middle age consumption at time
t and t+ 1 for parent’s and children of types i and j respectively:






















where γ = 1
1+ 1+φ
β
. Loan supply for household type i when the bequest motive is


















From where we can directly state that loan supply of an household expands if the
descendants are expected to become poorer, or the agent becomes richer. The
bequest motive is operative, Qit+1 > 0, if:
(1 + rbt )
Y m,jt+1 −Dt
Y m,it −Dt−1
= 1 + rijt < 1 + rt (3.B.11)
Note that rijt ≤ rlht , so that when rt > rlht bequest motives of all agents in this
economy are operative. As long as this relation persists, aggregate loan supply and
equilibrium real interest rate are not affected by a change in inequality as we can
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The corresponding equilibrium real interest is given by:
1 + rt =
1 + β
β








) = 1 + r∗t (3.B.13)
Then,







If children inherit their parents type, Y m,jt+1 = Y
m,i
t , and we assume Dt = Dt−1 = D




t , the zero lower bound bequest threshold is the same for both




t ), is always unaffected
by changes in income inequality.
Otherwise, if children and parents types are iid, and parents cannot predict their
children type then the problem from the parent perspective is the same as the one
previously specified, using an average income type for children with an endowment
equal to the constant weighed average population endowment Y m. Bequests are
positive for both types if












(Y m −Dt) +Dt−1 (3.B.16)
An increase of income inequality not affecting Y m does not affect aggregate loan
supply, demand, and the equilibrium real interest rate, as long as all endowments
remain above the threshold Y ∗t .
If income inequality increases at time t so that the bequest zero lower bound for low
income type becomes binding, or Y m,lt < Y
∗




t , then loan
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Aggregate Loan supply becomes a positive function of the high type income, and














The natural rate of interest, derived from equilibrium in the loan market, becomes
a decreasing function of the high type income:
1 + rt =
1 + β
β





(Y m −Dt−1) + (1− ηs) γβ
(
Y m,ht −Dt−1
) < 1 + r∗t (3.B.20)
When inequality increases above a certain level the bequest zero lower bound of
poor becomes binding, and their marginal savings with respect to income decreases
relative to the rich. Then the net effect on aggregate loan supply of an increase of
income inequality will be positive, and negative on the equilibrium real interest rate.
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